

Research Briefing

30 October 2025

By Claire Mills

Military assistance to Ukraine: What has changed in 2025?



Summary

- 1 A different approach by the US
- 2 Europe's plans to step up
- 3 Bilateral military assistance to Ukraine continues

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Summary

In 2025, military assistance to Ukraine has been evolving as the US, under the Trump administration, has adopted a different approach to the conflict and Europe has taken steps to assume greater responsibility for its security, including support for Ukraine. In April, European leaders said that [“Ukraine’s security is inseparable from Euro-Atlantic security”](#).

Military assistance to Ukraine during the tenure of the Biden administration is examined in Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#).

A different approach by the US

After taking office in January 2025, President Trump adopted a significantly different approach to Ukraine from his predecessor, President Biden.

The administration said achieving a negotiated peace agreement was a priority. In keeping with that aim President Trump has not sought congressional approval for any new funding for US military assistance to Ukraine, although the [US has largely continued to deliver the aid committed by the Biden administration](#). The US has also stepped back from leading the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which has been coordinating military assistance to Ukraine since the onset of the conflict.

President Trump’s change of approach to Ukraine came at a time when the [US’s commitment to European security was also frequently being called into question](#), and the [US was seeking a rapprochement with Russia](#).

However, [President Trump has expressed increasing frustration with President Putin](#) over Ukraine and the slow progress made in peace talks.

A new plan for military aid

At the beginning of July 2025, the US administration confirmed that some [military aid to Ukraine was being suspended while the Department of Defense conducted a capability review](#). That aid was reported to include [Patriot air defence missiles and precision guided weapons](#), including artillery.

That decision was reported to have [surprised the White House and the US State Department](#), and just a few days later that assistance, at the direction of President Trump, resumed.

On 14 July 2025, the US administration also announced [a new package of military assistance to Ukraine](#) (referred to as the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) mechanism). However, this does not mean a return to full and unconditional US military support for Ukraine. President Trump has been clear that the US will not pay for any of this new assistance. It will be funded by NATO allies, and some assets, including Patriot air defence systems, will be delivered to backfill European capabilities that will be sent to Ukraine in the first instance. The NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, has said that it is [“totally logical” for Europe to step up and fund US assistance](#).

Europe’s plans to step up

In contrast with the Trump administration, most European leaders (with the exception of Hungary) and the European Union have continued to express their [unwavering support for Ukraine](#) in the face of Russian aggression. Over the course of 2025, the UK and the EU have also continued to adopt [sanctions against Russia](#).

The changing international security situation has also prompted European nations to [agree increases in defence spending](#), to start making [plans for European rearmament](#) and to find innovative ways to continue supporting Ukraine, including through creating new financing mechanisms and increasing support for Ukraine’s defence industry.

In 2025 the UK and Germany have assumed [leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group](#). The UK and France are also leading proposals for a [‘coalition of the willing’](#), to support any potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

Bilateral military assistance continues

Supported by existing multinational initiatives such as the International Fund for Ukraine, the PURL, and new measures within the G7 and EU, countries are increasingly moving away from direct bilateral donations of military equipment from national inventories to the financing of procurement to allow for direct acquisition from industry. Greater emphasis is also being given to initiatives aimed at the joint production of capabilities between Ukraine’s defence industry and the UK/European defence industrial base.

1

A different approach by the US

After taking office in January 2025, President Trump adopted a significantly different approach toward Ukraine from his predecessor, President Biden.

The administration identified achieving a negotiated peace agreement as a priority. In keeping with that aim President Trump has not sought congressional approval for any new funding for US military assistance to Ukraine, although the US has largely continued to deliver aid committed by the Biden administration.¹ The US has also stepped back from leading the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which has been coordinating military assistance to Ukraine since the onset of the conflict.

President Trump's change of approach to Ukraine came at a time when the US's commitment to European security was also frequently being called into question, and the [US was seeking a rapprochement with Russia](#).² Both President Trump and President Putin have said they are keen to reset US–Russia relations and further economic cooperation.³

However, President Trump has also expressed increasing frustration with President Putin over Ukraine and the lack of progress made in peace talks. While the outcome of the [Trump-Putin summit in Alaska](#) in August 2025 was presented as largely positive, in October 2025 President Trump cancelled further face-to-face talks with President Putin in Hungary saying that “every time I speak with Vladimir, I have good conversations, and then they don’t go anywhere”.⁴ At the same time the US imposed additional sanctions on Russia, for the first time in President Trump's second term, and called on Russia to immediately agree to a ceasefire.⁵ Russia has repeatedly stated that it will not back down from [its maximalist demands](#) in Ukraine, including its goal of eliminating the root causes of the conflict.⁶

¹ This is examined in detail in Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

² See for example, Chatham House, [“Trump’s ‘electroshock’ on Ukraine ends the debate: Europe cannot rely on the US for its security”](#), 14 February 2025

³ President of Russia, [Telephone conversation with US President Donald Trump](#), 12 February 2025

⁴ CNN, [“How Trump’s plan for a Budapest summit with Putin turned into sanctions on Russia”](#), 24 October 2025

⁵ US Department of the Treasury, [Press release](#), 22 October 2025. Sanctions against Russia are examined in Commons Library briefing, [Sanctions against Russia: What has changed in 2025?](#)

⁶ President of Russia, [Commentary by Aide to the President of Russia Yuri Ushakov](#), 3 July 2025 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Ultrahang Youtube channel](#), 26 October 2025

1.1

Suspension of some US military aid – July 2025

At the beginning of July 2025, the US administration confirmed that some military aid to Ukraine was being suspended. This was while the Department of Defense conducts a capability review to ensure that the military aid it provides to other countries does not leave shortfalls in the US's own inventory. The review is in line with President Trump's 'America First' agenda.⁷

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said that the capability review was being conducted to ensure "US military aid aligns with our defense priorities" and that the department would not be providing updates regarding "specific quantities or types of munitions being provided to Ukraine, or the timelines associated with these transfers".⁸ It was, however, widely reported in the media that suspended aid included Patriot air defence missiles and precision guided weapons, including artillery, and munitions used by F-16 fighter jets.⁹

Reaction to the suspension

The decision to suspend some US aid was met with concern as Ukraine faces intensified Russian aerial attacks. At the end of June and beginning of July 2025, Russia conducted some of the largest drone and missile attacks on Ukraine since the start of the conflict in February 2022, increasingly targeting cities and towns in western Ukraine.¹⁰

Ukraine

On 2 July 2025, the Ukrainian Government said that it was trying to clarify the situation with the US and that it was important to "maintain stability, continuity and predictability in the provision of agreed upon defence assistance, primarily in the area of strengthening air defences".¹¹ The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that any decision to suspend military aid would encourage Russia to continue its war, rather than seek peace".¹²

⁷ Department of Defense, DoD News, "[DOD capability review to analyze where military aid goes, ensure America is first](#)", 2 July 2025

⁸ US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 2 July 2025

⁹ ABC News, "[US freezes air defense and precision weapons shipment to Ukraine, White House says](#)", 2 July 2025; Financial Times, "[Ukraine summons top US diplomat after Washington halts some arms supplies](#)", 2 July 2025 and Politico, "[Pentagon halting some promised munitions for Ukraine](#)", 1 July 2025

¹⁰ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, [UK statement to the OSCE](#), 3 July 2025; [UK statement to the OSCE](#), 16 July 2025 and Politico, "[As Trump admin bickers about arms halt, Russia hits Ukraine with missiles only Patriots can stop](#)", 9 July 2025

¹¹ President of Ukraine, [Address by the President](#), 2 July 2025 and Ukrainska Pravda, "[Ukrainian Defence Ministry responds to halt in US military aid](#)", 2 July 2025

¹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, [Statement](#), 2 July 2025

Ukraine has previously expressed its willingness to purchase air defence systems and other munitions from the US to make up for any capability shortfall.¹³

Think tanks

An assessment by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) agreed that the suspension of US aid will “likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past” and will reinforce President Putin’s view that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine. As a result, the ISW concludes that the US decision will not compel President Putin to negotiate a peace agreement, which is President Trump’s stated priority in Ukraine, but will “rather embolden Moscow to continue protracting Russia’s war”.¹⁴

The ISW also considers that, despite continued military aid to Ukraine by European and other allies, the US “remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses – at scale and quickly”.¹⁵

A previous assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in May 2025 shared this view. In an evaluation of whether Ukraine could continue to fight without US aid, the CSIS concluded that European support could not fully replace US capabilities, particularly in air defence:

Ukraine currently relies heavily on U.S. systems, training, intelligence, and logistics, and although European support and Ukraine’s own defense industry are substantial and growing, they cannot fully replace U.S. capabilities—particularly in the areas of air defense and intelligence assistance for precision targeting. The result is that continued U.S. aid remains extremely important for Ukraine’s long-term effectiveness on the battlefield. The broader geopolitical implications of a U.S. withdrawal could embolden Russia and its allies while straining transatlantic unity.¹⁶

Russia

Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, welcomed the suspension of some US assistance, saying that “the fewer weapons are supplied to Ukraine, the sooner the special military operation ends”.¹⁷

¹³ Ukrainska Pravda, “[Ukraine presents US with list of weapons it’s ready to buy](#)”, 21 June 2025

¹⁴ Institute for the Study of War, [Russian offensive campaign assessment](#), 2 July 2025

¹⁵ Institute for the Study of War, [Russian offensive campaign assessment](#), 3 July 2025

¹⁶ Center for Strategic and International Studies, [Can Ukraine fight without US aid? Seven questions to ask](#), May 2025

¹⁷ Interfax, “[The fewer weapons are supplied to Ukraine, the sooner special military operation ends – Peskov](#)”, 2 July 2025

1.2

A new plan for US military aid

The Pentagon decision to suspend some military aid was reported to have taken the White House and the US State Department by surprise.¹⁸ Only a few days at the initial announcement, the Pentagon said that, at the direction of President Trump, military aid would resume, and additional air defence assets would be provided to Ukraine.

On 14 July 2025, the US administration announced a new package of military assistance to Ukraine.¹⁹ However, the new assistance does not mean a return to full and unconditional US military support for Ukraine.²⁰ President Trump has been clear that the US will not pay for any of this new assistance, referring to the agreement as “business for us [the US]”.²¹ It will be funded by NATO allies and some assets, including Patriot air defence systems, will be delivered to backfill European capabilities that will be sent to Ukraine in the first instance.

Additional air defence

Following the suspension of some US military aid, President Trump and President Zelenskyy discussed Ukraine’s air defence requirements during a phone call between on 4 July 2025. Ukrainian and US officials reportedly agreed to further discussions on “additional practical enhancements to air defense”, although no details were provided.²²

On 7 July the Pentagon subsequently announced that, at the direction of President Trump, additional defensive weapons would be sent to Ukraine “to ensure the Ukrainians can defend themselves while we work to secure a lasting peace and ensure the killing stops”. The Pentagon statement confirmed that the capability review framework remains in effect but provided no further information.²³ It was not clear, at the time, whether the decision to provide additional weapons amounted to a total resumption of the weapons deliveries that were suspended, including Patriot air defence missiles.

The Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL)

During a meeting with the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 14 July 2025, President Trump announced that the US would provide Ukraine with a significant package of new military assistance.²⁴

¹⁸ Politico, “[Why Europe doesn’t trust Trump’s latest Ukraine reversal](#)”, 9 July 2025

¹⁹ You Tube, [President Trump participates in a meeting with the NATO Secretary General](#), 14 July 2025

²⁰ BBC News, “[Trump weapons pledge marks major step forward for Ukraine](#)”, 14 July 2025

²¹ You Tube, [President Trump participates in a meeting with the NATO Secretary General](#), 14 July 2025

²² President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 4 July 2025

²³ US Department of Defense, [Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell on Ukraine military aid](#), 7 July 2025

²⁴ You Tube, [President Trump participates in a meeting with the NATO Secretary General](#), 14 July 2025

Funded by NATO allies

“Trump appears to have guaranteed that the all-important US weapons pipeline to Ukraine will remain open for now – provided others pay for it”.

Paul Adams, BBC diplomatic correspondent, 14 July 2025

In contrast to previous US military assistance, however, none of the new aid will be funded by the United States.²⁵

Through [the Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List \(PURL\) mechanism](#), equipment, including air defence, precision guided missiles and munitions, will be manufactured and delivered by the United States but funded by NATO allies.

In some cases, that equipment will be used to backfill capabilities that, for the sake of speed, NATO allies will provide in the immediate to short term. It is expected Patriot defence systems held by several European allies will be delivered to Ukraine and then backfilled by the United States.

NATO will coordinate the funding and delivery of equipment to Ukraine, including through the NATO Security Assistance and Training (NSATU) command (see section 2.1 below), and in conjunction with the US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whittaker.²⁶ Equipment is expected to be sent in tranches and will be based on Ukraine’s requirements.

NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, said that for Europe to pay for US military assistance was “totally logical” and a good example of Europe “stepping up”.²⁷

In its daily assessment of the conflict, the Institute for the Study of War said that President Trump was “acting upon the reality” that bringing President Putin to the negotiating table would require using both economic measures and military support “to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield”.²⁸

Equipment committed under PURL

At the time of writing, NATO has announced four PURL packages, worth approximately \$2 billion (\$500 million each), and financed by the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany and Canada.²⁹

So far, PURL packages have come from existing US stockpiles, enabling Ukraine to rapidly take delivery. The first batch of Patriot air defence missiles and HIMARS rocket launchers financed under the PURL mechanism were reportedly delivered in September 2025.³⁰

²⁵ You Tube, [President Trump participates in a meeting with the NATO Secretary General](#), 14 July 2025

²⁶ NATO, [NATO’s support for Ukraine: Key support activities, PURL](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

²⁷ As above

²⁸ Institute for the Study of War, [Russian offensive campaign assessment](#), 14 July 2025

²⁹ NATO, [Press release](#), 4 August 2025; [Press release](#), 5 August 2025; [Press release](#), 13 August 2025 and [Press release](#), 24 August 2025

³⁰ You Tube, [Press conference with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy](#), 17 September 2025. See also President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 30 September 2025

A fifth package of assistance, financed by Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg, Belgium and Iceland, is currently under discussion.³¹

Following a NATO ministerial on 15 October 2025, the NATO Secretary General confirmed that “more than half of NATO Allies have now signed up, securing this crucial flow of support for Ukraine”.³²

1.3

Ukraine’s request for US Tomahawk missiles

Ahead of talks with President Trump in October 2025, President Zelenskyy indicated that Ukraine was seeking US long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of hitting targets, with precision, deep within Russian territory. The provision of such capability, Ukraine believes, would compel President Putin to take peace talks more seriously.³³

Despite hinting that the [US could provide Ukraine with Tomahawks](#), potentially as a means to forcing peace talks, following US-Ukraine talks on 17 October President Trump said that the move “could mean bigger escalation” and that the US did not want to “give away things that we need to protect our country”.³⁴ The US has only developed a land-based mobile launcher, capable of deploying Tomahawk missiles, in the last few years, having been previously prohibited under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The US withdrew from that treaty in 2019, during President Trump’s first term.³⁵ The naval version of the Tomahawk has been in service since the 1980s but Ukraine has no surface navy from which to deploy a naval variant.

The meeting subsequently ended with no agreement. President Zelenskyy suggested that discussions would remain ongoing, although he said he was “realistic” about the prospects.³⁶

In a previous telephone call with President Trump on 16 October, President Putin said that Tomahawks “would not change the situation on the battlefield but would inflict substantial damage to relations between our countries, to say nothing of the prospects for a peaceful settlement”.³⁷ Responding to suggestions that the US had authorised the use of some Western-supplied

³¹ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 30 September 2025

³² NATO, [Press conference](#), 15 October 2025

³³ The Guardian, [“What are Tomahawk missiles and why does Ukraine want them?”](#), 17 October 2025
Under the Biden administration the US had previously provided an undisclosed number of long-range ATACMs (Army Tactical Missile Systems) to Ukraine which were used to strike limited targets in Russia. See section 3.3 of Commons Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

³⁴ BBC News, [“Trump tells BBC that Tomahawks could be seen as escalation by Putin”](#), 17 October 2025

³⁵ Center for Strategic and International Studies, [Will the Tomahawks save Ukraine?](#), 17 October 2025.
US withdrawal and its implications is also examined in Commons Library research briefing, [Demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty](#), September 2019

³⁶ BBC News, [“Zelensky fails to secure Tomahawk missiles at talks with Trump”](#), 17 October 2025 and
The Financial Times, [“Trump resists Zelenskyy’s plea for Tomahawk missiles”](#), 17 October 2025

³⁷ President of Russia, [Commentary by Aide to the President of Russia](#), 16 October 2025

long-range missiles against targets deep in Russia (a suggestion that President Trump denied and said was “[fake news](#)”), President Putin warned on 23 October that the response to the use of long-range missiles to strike Russian territory would be “very serious, if not overwhelming. Let them think about that”.³⁸

³⁸ President of Russia, [Answers to media questions](#), 23 October 2025

2

Europe's plans to step up

The Trump administration's approach to Ukraine and its increasing rapprochement with Russia has been in stark contrast to the approach of most European leaders (with the exception of Hungary) and the European Union who have continued to express their [unwavering support for Ukraine](#) in the face of Russian aggression. The UK and the EU have also continued to adopt [sanctions against Russia](#).

The changing security dynamic has also prompted European nations to [agree increases in defence spending](#), to start making plans for European rearmament and to find innovative ways to continue supporting Ukraine.

Despite European efforts to offset the halt in US assistance, in an October 2025 assessment of military aid to Ukraine, up to and including August 2025, the Kiel Institute suggested that military support had fallen by 43%, compared to the first half of 2025.³⁹ This 'fall' in military support is an assessment that the NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, has denied. Ahead of a NATO ministerial on 15 October 2025, he said that military support "when you look at this year, it is more or less, on average, with last year".⁴⁰

2.1

Leadership and coordination

Leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG)

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) has been the main forum through which countries supporting Ukraine have discussed and implemented the coordination of military assistance (See Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)).

Led by the US under the Biden administration, the future of the group had been questioned in the face of President Trump's [opposition to continued military support to Ukraine](#) and his [push for a negotiated peace settlement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict](#).

³⁹ Kiel Institute, [Ukraine Support Tracker: Military aid falls sharply despite new NATO initiative](#), 14 October 2025

⁴⁰ NATO, [Doorstep by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte](#), 15 October 2025

In January 2025 US officials said that it would be for the next administration to decide its policy on Ukraine but that the UDCG had been “built to adapt and built to last”.⁴¹ The UK, Poland, France, Germany and Italy (the Group of Five), expressed their support for its continuation as an “important forum for us to announce and deliver military equipment for Ukraine”.⁴²

Consequently, in February 2025, the UK chaired a meeting of the UDCG for the first time. The US participated in the meeting, and in his opening remarks the new US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth addressed speculation about future US leadership of the group by thanking the UK for “hosting and now leading the UDCG”.⁴³

Subsequent meetings of the UDCG at ministerial level, on 11 April, 4 June, 21 July, 9 September 2025 and 15 October 2025 have been chaired by the UK and Germany.⁴⁴ A meeting of the UDCG National Armament Directors in April 2025 was also co-chaired by Ukraine, Germany and the UK.⁴⁵ Rotation between the Group of Five nations had previously been considered a possibility.⁴⁶

Long-term capability coalitions continue

Securing Ukraine’s long-term security has become an increasing focus of the UDCG. As a result, several ‘capability coalitions’ across the air, land and maritime domains have been established. They seek not only to address Ukraine’s immediate priorities, but also to provide Ukraine with coherent future capability and strengthen Ukraine’s defence industrial base.

Nine capability coalitions have been established so far, the most recent on electromagnetic warfare in April 2025. The purpose of each coalition is to “[create a greater and more coherent plan...which will further the options for future support and co-funding](#)”. They are overseen by the Capability Coalition Leadership Group (CCLG). On 9 January 2025, the [CCLG endorsed roadmaps](#) setting out the approach to be taken by each coalition through to 2027:

- F-16/air force coalition (led by US, Denmark and the Netherlands) – the coalition will [initially support Ukraine in creating a complete F-16 capability](#) through the training of pilots, the donation of aircraft and the provision of necessary infrastructure and maintenance within Ukraine. The longer-term objective is to build “a full-scale Ukrainian air force”.
 - Training on fourth generation aircraft, including the F-16, is being delivered collectively by a group of nations, including the UK, [which has been delivering basic flight training](#). Advanced flight training

⁴¹ US Department of Defense, [Press conference](#), 9 January 2025

⁴² Ministry of Defence, [Joint Statement by Group of Five Defence Ministers](#), 13 January 2025

⁴³ US Department of Defense, [Opening remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group](#), 12 February 2025

⁴⁴ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 April 2025; [Press release](#), 4 June 2025; [Press release](#), 21 July 2025; [Press release](#), 9 September 2025 and [Press release](#), 14 October 2025

⁴⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Joint statement: 16th Ukraine Defence Contact Group – National Armament Directors Format](#), 15 April 2025

⁴⁶ The Times, [“UK handed leadership role in Ukraine defence group as US pulls back”](#), 6 February 2025

has been taking place in Denmark and the US and in November 2023, an F-16 European training hub was also opened in Romania.

- Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway have all committed to providing F-16 aircraft and [an initial operating capability was achieved in summer 2024](#). Concerns remain, however, over [the ability to maintain the F-16 in theatre](#).
- Ground-based air defence (France and Germany): – the intention is to create a NATO-compatible ground-based air defence system that will replace the ad-hoc systems that are currently in place across Ukraine. At the first meeting of the coalition in December 2023, [three working groups were established, focusing on command structure, systems and training](#).
- Artillery (France and the US) – the main focus of the coalition is the [provision of artillery and ammunition to Ukraine in the short term](#). In the longer term, the coalition aims to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s artillery capabilities and interoperability with allies.
- Maritime security (the UK and Norway) – [the coalition will develop Ukraine’s naval capabilities](#) and strengthen its ability to operate along its coastlines and into the Black Sea. It will include providing ships, vehicles, training and infrastructure.
- De-mining (Lithuania and Iceland) – the coalition aims to [coordinate existing and future demining assistance](#).
- Information security/IT (Estonia and Luxembourg) – the coalition will focus on [developing a secure and resilient IT infrastructure for Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and its armed forces](#).
- Armoured vehicles and manoeuvrability (Poland, Germany and Italy) – [the coalition aims to strengthen Ukraine’s military vehicle fleet](#) and ensure maintenance and repair
- Drones (UK and Latvia) – [the coalition aims to provide Ukraine with thousands of drones](#) and components and to support innovation.
- Electromagnetic warfare (EW) (Germany, with support from Sweden) – [the coalition will coordinate the procurement of EW capabilities](#), training and the development of EW policies and doctrine. It was established in April 2025.

A role for NATO

NATO, as an alliance, has been clear in its political support of Ukraine and fully supports the provision of bilateral military assistance by individual allies to enable it to “uphold its right of self-defence”.⁴⁷ NATO has been helping to

⁴⁷ NATO, [Relations with Ukraine](#) and [NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

coordinate requests for assistance from the Ukrainian Government and is supporting the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid.⁴⁸

However, Ukraine is not a NATO member and therefore isn't party to NATO's mutual defence clause under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. As such, NATO troops will not be deployed on the ground in Ukraine. Allies have also ruled out imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine because it would risk bringing Russia into direct conflict with NATO forces.⁴⁹

Comprehensive Assistance Package

NATO military support prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was primarily provided through a [Comprehensive Assistance Package \(CAP\) that had been agreed in 2016](#).

Focused on capacity building and defence reform, the measures outlined in the CAP provide non-lethal assistance. The CAP was updated in 2022 to provide long-term, sustained support and to help Ukraine move away from Soviet-era equipment and bring Ukrainian forces and equipment up to NATO standards.

In April 2023, the NATO Secretary General said that the CAP would be developed into a new strategic multi-year assistance programme which would "assist Ukraine on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration".⁵⁰ That programme was agreed at the Vilnius Summit in July 2023.⁵¹

Establishing NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)

At the Washington Summit in July 2024, allies agreed to establish the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Command.⁵² That command, headed by [a three-star general](#), has been established in Germany along with several logistical nodes in eastern Europe. Approximately 700 NATO personnel are deployed as part of the new command.⁵³

Working alongside the UDCG, NSATU will coordinate the provision of military training and equipment by NATO allies and will provide logistical support. These roles were previously undertaken by the International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC) in which the UK played a leading role.⁵⁴ In the longer term it will also support the transformation of Ukraine's defence forces

NSATU will not "under international law, make NATO a party to the conflict".

[Washington Declaration](#), July 2024

⁴⁸ NATO, [NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

⁴⁹ NATO, [NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 29 June 2022)

⁵⁰ NATO, [NATO Foreign Ministers wrap up meetings with focus on China and support to Ukraine](#), 5 April 2023

⁵¹ NATO, [Vilnius Summit Communiqué](#), 11 July 2023

⁵² NATO, [Washington Declaration](#), 10 July 2024, para.15

⁵³ US Department of Defense, [Press briefing](#), 12 July 2024

⁵⁴ US Department of Defense, [Background briefing on Ukraine](#), 8 January 2025. The IDCC is examined in Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

and enable interoperability and further integration with NATO.⁵⁵ Specifically NSATU is expected to:

- Coordinate the training of Ukrainian personnel at facilities in NATO nations.
- Take responsibility for the planning and coordination of donations by allies.
- Manage the transfer and repair of equipment.
- Provide support to the long-term development of Ukraine's armed forces.⁵⁶

An NSATU trust fund has also been established to help meet Ukraine's urgent equipment and logistical support needs, including spare parts and fuel for vehicles, training and consumables to support troops on the frontline.⁵⁷

Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List

As outlined above (see section 1.2), in July 2025 NATO allies agreed [the Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List \(PURL\) mechanism](#), through which equipment for Ukraine, including air defence, precision guided missiles and munitions, will be manufactured and delivered by the United States but funded by NATO allies.

NATO will coordinate the funding and delivery of that equipment to Ukraine, in conjunction with the US.⁵⁸ Equipment will be sent in tranches and will be based on Ukraine's requirements.

Pledge of long-term security assurance for Ukraine

At the 2024 summit, NATO allies also agreed a [Pledge of long-term security assurance for Ukraine](#). That pledge commits allies to provide a minimum of €40 billion for military assistance to Ukraine by the middle of 2025. That commitment extends to all costs related to the provision of military equipment, assistance (including non-lethal aid and investment in Ukraine's defence industry) and training, whether delivered through NATO, bilaterally, multilaterally or "by any other means".⁵⁹

⁵⁵ NATO, [Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Council](#), 11 July 2024, para.5

⁵⁶ US Department of Defense, ["US will continue to lead support of Ukraine through Contact Group"](#), DoD News, 9 July 2024

⁵⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 4 June 2025

⁵⁸ NATO, [NATO's support for Ukraine: Key support activities, PURL](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

⁵⁹ Specifically, those costs include the purchase of military equipment for Ukraine; in-kind support donated to Ukraine; costs related to maintenance, logistics and transportation of military equipment for Ukraine; costs for military training; operational costs associated with provision of military support; investments in and support for Ukraine's defence infrastructure and defence industry; all contributions to NATO Trust Funds for Ukraine, including non-lethal aid (NATO, [Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine](#), July 2024)

Allies will aim to meet this pledge through proportional contributions, according to their share of total gross domestic product (GDP) between NATO allies. They will report on their contributions in relation to this pledge twice a year and NATO leaders will re-evaluate allied contributions at future NATO summits, starting in 2025.⁶⁰

At the NATO summit in the Hague in June 2025, allies reaffirmed their “enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”.⁶¹ In remarks to the NATO Public Forum on 24 June, the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that 35 billion (without specifying US dollars or euros) in military support to Ukraine had been pledged by Canada and European NATO allies in the first half of 2025 and that there had been a shift in burden sharing on Ukraine:

at this moment, the Europeans and the Canadians have pledged for this year, 35 billion in military support to Ukraine. Last year, it was just over 50 billion for the full year [...] that means that the support for Ukraine is still at a level even higher than it was last year. And we also see a shift of the burden from the US more to the Canadians and Europeans, which I think is fair, that we take a bigger share of this burden as Europeans and Canadians from the United States.⁶²

International Fund for Ukraine

In April 2022 several allies, led by the UK, established an [International Fund for Ukraine \(IFU\)](#) to coordinate the purchase and transport of military equipment to Ukraine from third countries and/or industry.⁶³ The IFU was later expanded to finance the rapid purchase of military equipment for Ukraine, to support Ukraine in the procurement process and to facilitate training. The longer-term intention is to help Ukraine purchase equipment directly from the defence industry, rather than relying on other countries’ donations from their own stockpiles.⁶⁴

To date, over £2 billion has been contributed to the IFU by the UK, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Lithuania, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Portugal and Canada.⁶⁵

The IFU is financing the urgent procurement of capabilities including artillery ammunition, drones, air defence, maritime capabilities, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare systems, manoeuvre support, combat vehicles spares and mine clearance equipment.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ NATO, [Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine](#), July 2024

⁶¹ NATO, [The Hague Summit Declaration](#), 25 June 2025

⁶² NATO, [Remarks by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the NATO Public Forum](#), 24 June 2025

⁶³ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 27 April 2022

⁶⁴ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Norwegian), 11 August 2022

⁶⁵ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 September 2025

⁶⁶ Ministry of Defence, [International Fund for Ukraine](#) (accessed 10 July 2025)

Using profits from sanctioned Russian assets

In 2024, separate proposals were agreed by G7 countries and EU member states to use the profits from sanctioned Russian assets, held in their respective jurisdictions, to help finance military assistance to Ukraine.

Current proposals to establish a €140 billion loan to Ukraine, financed using frozen Russian assets within the EU, which could be used, in part, for military support, have yet to be agreed.⁶⁷

EU ‘windfall profits’ agreement

On 21 May 2024 the EU approved the use of net windfall profits generated from sanctioned Russian state assets held within the EU (estimated to be worth approximately €2.5 billion per year) to be used to support Ukraine’s self-defence and reconstruction. Under the initial agreement, 90% of that funding would be channelled through the Ukraine Fund within the European Peace Facility for military assistance. Part of the funds will be used by the EU member states to procure capabilities for the Ukrainian armed forces. The remaining funds will be used to procure capabilities directly from the Ukrainian defence industry. The remaining 10% would support EU humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programmes.⁶⁸ In October 2024, the EU agreed new rules that will see 95% of those windfall profits allocated to the EU budget and channelled through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation mechanism to help Ukraine repay EU and G7 loans. The remaining 5% will be allocated to the European Peace Facility.⁶⁹

At the time of writing, €3.6 billion has been made available under the mechanism so far (€1.4 billion in July 2024 and €2.1 billion in April 2025).⁷⁰ Within the second tranche of funding, €1 billion has been earmarked for direct procurement for the Ukrainian defence industry.⁷¹

G7 loan agreement

In June 2024 G7 countries and EU also agreed to extend \$50 billion of loans to Ukraine that will be “serviced and repaid” by future profits generated by immobilised Russian assets in the EU and the jurisdictions of the other non-EU G7 countries. Part of these loans will be used for military assistance, disbursed “through multiple channels that direct funds to Ukraine’s military”. Funds will also be used for Ukraine’s economic and reconstruction needs.⁷²

⁶⁷ Politico, “[How Belgium’s De Wever derailed the EU’s ‘insane’ €140B loan plan](#)”, 24 October 2025 and Politico, “[EU split over whether to let Ukraine use €140B loan to buy US weapons](#)”, 22 October 2025 (subscription required). See also European Council, [Press release](#), 23 October 2025

⁶⁸ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 21 May 2024

⁶⁹ Council of the European Union, [EU military support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

⁷⁰ Council of the European Union, [EU solidarity with Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

⁷¹ Interfax, “[EU to provide Ukraine with EUR1 billion in grants for defense industry based on “Danish model – ambassador”](#)”, 10 April 2025

⁷² [G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué](#), 14 June 2024

The details of those loans were agreed in October 2024 and funds will be made available from the end of 2024 until December 2027.⁷³

UK–French leadership of a potential ‘coalition of the willing’

Several countries, led by the UK and France, have been working to develop a ‘coalition of the willing’ to defend any peace deal that is eventually agreed in Ukraine.⁷⁴ Many, including the UK Prime Minister, believe that Russia would violate a peace deal “without anything behind it” and that “the time for planning is now”.⁷⁵

“Any deal must be backed by strength”.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer, 2 March 2025

At a meeting of international leaders on 2 March 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer acknowledged that “not every nation will feel able to contribute”, but that planning among countries willing to contribute to some form of peacekeeping or reassurance force would begin with a sense of “real urgency”. At that initial meeting, he made specific commitments to back up that force by deploying, if necessary, UK “boots on the ground, and planes in the air”. He also made clear that “to succeed, this effort must have strong US backing”.⁷⁶ France also committed to deploying forces.⁷⁷

Further detailed planning sessions, at both the ministerial and military level, have taken place over the last six months.⁷⁸

In a statement to the House of Commons on 17 July 2025, the Defence Secretary John Healey provided an update on the status of the coalition of the willing, what has also been referred to as ‘Multinational Force Ukraine’. He said over 200 military planners from 30 countries had contributed to the detailed military planning which was now complete and had included reconnaissance work in Ukraine.

He confirmed that command and control structures had been agreed for any future multinational force which would be tasked with “strengthen[ing] Ukraine’s defences on the land, at sea and in the air”. The force will include a multinational command headquarters in Paris, that will rotate to London after the first 12 months. A co-ordination headquarters would be established

⁷³ G7 [Annex to the G7 finance ministers’ statement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration \(ERA\) Loan initiative](#) (PDF), 25 October 2024

⁷⁴ Prime Minister’s Office, [PM remarks at international leaders’ summit press conference](#), 2 March 2025 and [HC Deb 3 March 2025](#), c25

⁷⁵ Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 20 March 2025

⁷⁶ As above. See also The Guardian, [“Where does the phrase ‘coalition of the willing’ come from?”](#), 2 March 2025

⁷⁷ France 24, [Televised Address by President Emmanuel Macron](#), 5 March 2025

⁷⁸ Prime Minister’s Office, [PM statement at press conference on the Coalition of the Willing](#), 15 March 2025; [Press release](#), 27 March 2025; Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 5 April 2025; [Press release](#), 10 April 2025 and [Joint UK-France statement](#), 10 April 2025; Prime Minister’s Office, [Statement](#), 10 July 2025; [Statement](#), 13 August 2025

in Kyiv following deployment of the force, which will be headed by a British two-star military officer.

Through Multinational Force Ukraine. Ukrainian land forces will be “regenerated by providing logistics, armament and training experts”, while Ukraine’s skies will be secured by coalition aircraft providing a similar level of support that is currently used for [NATO’s air policing missions](#). The Black Sea taskforce will also be strengthened with additional specialist teams.⁷⁹

The UK Government has previously said that “It is important to maintain discretion when commenting on the specific details of these discussions, until the conditions of the necessary ceasefire are clear”.⁸⁰ Ukraine has said that it is ready to issue an invitation to the force and enter into formal agreements with participating nations as and when necessary.⁸¹

US may provide security guarantees

Initially, the Trump administration said that the US would not provide any form of security guarantees to Ukraine.

As part of its ‘[final offer](#)’ proposals in April 2025, the US supported the concept of a European-led ‘reassurance force’ but said that it would not be reinforced by US forces. US administration officials, including the Vice President, JD Vance, suggested at the time that the agreement that had been reached on [US access to Ukraine’s reserves of rare earth minerals](#) and other critical raw materials, would give the US a vested economic interest in the future of the country and would be a better security guarantee for Ukraine than any form of military commitment.⁸²

Ahead of his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska in August 2025, however, President Trump indicated that the US could, alongside Europe, offer some form of security guarantees to Ukraine.

Details of what US support and coordination could look like are limited. In a post on Truth Social on 18 August 2025 President Trump said that security guarantees would be provided by various European countries in “coordination with the United States of America”.⁸³ He has made clear that any security guarantees will not be NATO-based guarantees.⁸⁴ Direct US military

⁷⁹ HC Deb 17 July 2025, [Ukraine](#), c476 and Prime Minister’s Office, [Press release](#), 10 July 2025

⁸⁰ Ministry of Defence, [Joint UK-France statement](#), 10 April 2025

⁸¹ Prime Minister’s Office, [Statement](#), 10 July 2025

⁸² [Interview with Fox News](#), 3 March 2025. See also US Department of War, [Opening Remarks](#), 12 February 2025 and [The Tucker Carlson Show](#), 21 March 2025. In [an interview with The Times](#) on 11 April 2025, US Special Envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, reportedly suggested that Ukraine could be partitioned as part of any peace deal with a European-led reassurance force, Ukrainian forces and Russian forces all adopting zones of control. He later said that the newspaper had misrepresented his comments and that he was referring to areas of potential responsibility for an allied force that would not include US troops (see Euromaidan Press, [“Kellogg claims Times misrepresented his Ukraine partition comments”](#), 12 April 2025)

⁸³ Donald J. Trump, [@realDonaldTrump](#), Truth Social, 18 August 2025 (accessed 20 August 2025)

⁸⁴ The White House YouTube Channel, [President Trump gaggles with the press on Air Force One](#), 15 August 2025

assistance will also not be provided. Instead, the US is providing arms that are funded entirely by NATO allies (see above).⁸⁵

In an interview with Fox News on 19 August 2025, President Trump suggested that US air support was a possibility but ruled out US troops on the ground.⁸⁶

Russian opposition

Russia rejects the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine to monitor and enforce any peace agreement, calling it “demonstrably unviable”.⁸⁷

In response, both President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer have said that the deployment of allied forces in Ukrainian territory was “not up to Russia to accept or not”.⁸⁸

2.2 EU support for Ukraine

In June 2024, the EU and Ukraine signed an [agreement on long-term security cooperation](#) (PDF).⁸⁹ The agreement envisages EU support to Ukraine “for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed”. In addition to the long-term provision of military equipment and training, the agreement also commits to strengthening Ukraine’s domestic defence industry so that it may achieve greater self-sufficiency.

European peace facility continues

Much of the military assistance to Ukraine has been provided bilaterally between individual EU member states and Ukraine (see section 3).

However, the EU has also been providing military equipment and training through its [European Peace Facility](#) (EPF). This is the first time the bloc has, in its history, approved the supply of lethal weapons to a third country using EU money.

⁸⁵ See Commons Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine: What has changed in 2025?](#)

⁸⁶ Fox News, [“Trump reflects on historic Ukraine peace talks, working toward Putin-Zelenskyy meeting”](#), 19 August 2025

⁸⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Foreign Minister’s statement](#), 18 February 2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s written interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo](#), 28 April 2025 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, [Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on statements by British officials regarding the Ukrainian conflict](#), 18 August 2025

⁸⁸ The Kyiv Independent, [“West can send troops to Ukraine without Russia’s permission, Macron says”](#), 16 March 2025 and The Guardian, [“Starmer warns Putin of ‘severe consequences’ if he breaches peace deal”](#), 20 March 2025

⁸⁹ The agreement is examined in greater detail in Library research briefing: [Security guarantees to Ukraine](#)

To date, the EU has committed €11.1 billion of EPF funding for military support to Ukraine, including €5 billion for a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund which was agreed in March 2024:

- Seven individual tranches of military assistance (approximately €500 million each).
- The establishment of a €5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund.
- Two industry assistance measures (collectively worth €2 billion) for the joint procurement of ammunition and missiles.
- Financial support for the EU Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine (€362 million).⁹⁰

Combined with the bilateral military assistance being provided by EU member states, overall EU military support to Ukraine is estimated at the time of writing, at €63.2 billion.⁹¹

EU training mission for Ukraine

In November 2022, the EU launched a [military training mission to Ukraine](#) (EUMAM Ukraine) that would complement existing bilateral and multilateral training efforts.⁹² Initially mandated for two years, it aimed to provide specialised training to 30,000 Ukrainian armed forces personnel, at various locations across the EU. The mission is open to participation by third states.⁹³ As of November 2024, financial support for EUMAM Ukraine totalled €382 million.

The mission's mandate has subsequently been extended for a further two years, until 15 November 2026 and with an allocated budget of €409 million.⁹⁴

Over 80,000 Ukrainian personnel have been trained under the programme so far.⁹⁵

EU White Paper on Defence Readiness and an EU rearmament plan – March 2025

In response to the shift in US policy on Ukraine under President Trump, the US's increasing rapprochement with Russia and concerns over the US's commitment to European security, the EU has begun making plans for European rearmament.

⁹⁰ Council of the European Union, [EU solidarity with Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

⁹¹ As above

⁹² EU External Action Service, [Informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers: Press remarks by EU High Representative](#), 30 August 2022

⁹³ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 17 October 2022

⁹⁴ Council of the European Union, [Press release](#), 8 November 2024

⁹⁵ Council of the European Union, [EU solidarity with Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

In March 2025, the European Commission and the EU High Representative, Kaja Kallas, presented a [White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030](#) (PDF), along with a specific plan for financing European rearmament ([ReArm Europe Plan](#) (PDF)), which envisages unlocking more than €800 billion in defence investment over the next few years.

While setting out a framework for EU member states to achieve greater strategic autonomy in European defence and security, both documents acknowledge that “the future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole”, and that in the short term, “support for Ukraine is the immediate and most pressing task”.⁹⁶

A [Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030](#) (PDF), which “translates the White Paper [...] into clear objectives, milestones, with concrete dates for deliverables, and indicators to track progress” was adopted by the European Council in October 2025.⁹⁷

Support to the Ukraine defence industry

The white paper and the defence readiness roadmap support the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) as part of Ukraine’s accession to the EU.

They argue that the most effective and cost-efficient means of supporting Ukraine is through direct support to its domestic defence industry, most notably through directly procuring capabilities from it; this would be financed by EU member states which would then donate capabilities to the Ukrainian armed forces. The white paper highlights the G7 loan agreement and the Ukraine Assistance Fund (see above) as the primary means of financing such support.

The Ukrainian defence industry will also be able to access a new EU financing instrument, [Security Action for Europe \(SAFE\)](#) (PDF), which has been established under the rearmament plan. Through this initiative, the European Commission will borrow up to €150 billion on capital markets, which will be distributed to EU and other participating states in the form of long-term loans to rapidly increase investments in critical defence capabilities through joint procurement from the European defence industry.

A cross-cutting EU–Ukraine taskforce has also been established to reinforce existing cooperation with the Ukraine Defence Contact Group and NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine, and to enhance “industrial cooperation between EDTIB and the Ukrainian defence industry”.⁹⁸ The taskforce will focus on delivering potential flagship projects between the EU

⁹⁶ European Commission/ EU High Representative, [Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030](#) (PDF), 19 March 2025

⁹⁷ European Council, [Conclusions](#) (PDF), 23 October 2025

⁹⁸ European Commission/ EU High Representative, [Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030](#) (PDF), 19 March 2025

and Ukrainian defence industries, some of which have been identified through the existing EU–Ukraine Defence Industry Forum.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ European Commission, [Press release](#), 13 May 2025. The EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum was established in late 2023 as part of a series of international defence industry events initiated by the Ukrainian government. A similar forum for cooperation was established with the UK at the same time ([Taskforce Hirst](#)). The aim of the forum is to strengthen cooperation between the EU and Ukrainian defence industry, identify potential capability projects and encourage joint procurement.

3 Bilateral military assistance to Ukraine continues

Direct military assistance to Ukraine has been largely bilateral: donated directly from each country to Ukraine.

Bilateral military assistance continues, although it is evolving. Supported by existing multinational initiatives and measures within the G7 and EU (see above, section 2), countries are increasingly moving away from direct donations of military equipment from national inventories to the financing of procurement to allow for acquisition direct from industry. Greater emphasis is also being given to initiatives aimed at the joint production of capabilities between Ukraine's defence industry and the UK/European defence industrial base.

The following section gives headline information on support from each country and sources for further information, where available. It updates the information on bilateral assistance available in sections 3.4 and 3.5 of Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#).

This paper does not attempt to rank countries in terms of the military assistance they are providing to Ukraine or to make comparisons between individual countries and/or the US and Europe. Comparative data on the level of assistance being provided to Ukraine is available from organisations such as the Kiel Institute through its [Ukraine Support Tracker](#).

3.1 Headline support from the UK

The UK has been one of the leading donors to Ukraine, alongside the US and Germany.

To date, the UK has pledged [£21.8 billion in support to Ukraine](#) since February 2022. Of that funding, total military financing stands at £13.06 billion. £10.8 billion is for [military assistance that has been gifted](#) (including £3 billion in 2025/26), and the remainder is a £2.26 million loan announced in October 2024 as part of [the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Loans agreement \(ERA\)](#) (PDF). The loan is additional one-off financing that will be paid back from the proceeds of frozen Russian state assets.

The UK has provided both lethal and non-lethal weaponry and equipment, including tanks, air defence systems, artillery, and long-range precision

strike missiles. While the UK has committed to training Ukrainian fast jet pilots, combat fighter aircraft will not be provided.

In February 2025 the UK chaired [the Ukraine Defence Contact Group](#) for the first time after the US said it was stepping back (see section 1). It has continued leadership of the group alongside Germany.

The UK is also hosting a training programme ([Operation Interflex](#)), which is supported by thirteen international partners. In August 2025 the Ministry of Defence confirmed that the training programme would be [extended until, at least, the end of 2026](#).

On 12 January 2024, the UK was the first country to announce a [ten-year year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine](#) (PDF). In January 2025 the UK and Ukraine also agreed [a 100-year partnership agreement](#).

Further reading

- Commons Library research briefing, [Detailed timeline of UK military assistance to Ukraine \(February 2022 to present\)](#).

3.2

Headline support from allies

NATO countries

Albania

The Albanian Government has confirmed its support for Ukraine but does not provide details of the military assistance that it provides.¹⁰⁰

Belgium

As of March 2025, Belgian military assistance stands at €1.27 billion.¹⁰¹

It has provided both lethal and non-lethal weaponry including anti-tank weapons, machine guns, ammunition, armoured vehicles and air defence missiles.¹⁰² Belgium has also channelled non-lethal military assistance

¹⁰⁰ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and the Republic of Albania](#), 21 January 2025

¹⁰¹ Kingdom of Belgium, [Belgium supports Ukraine](#) (accessed 4 July 2025)

¹⁰² [Alexander De Croo](#): @alexanderdecroo, X (formerly Twitter), 26 February 2022 (in French); Flanders News, [“Belgium to send new weapons to Ukraine”](#), 22 April 2022; Prime Minister of Belgium, [Press release](#), 28 January 2023; Prime Minister of Belgium, [Press release](#), 12 May 2023; The Brussels Times, [“Belgium approves 14th military aid package for Ukraine”](#), 10 June 2023

through NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package and contributes to the EU training mission for Ukraine (see section 2 above).¹⁰³

Belgium is committed to the development of Ukraine's armed forces in the longer term and is part of six UDCG Capability Coalitions (see above): IT, demining, munitions, air defence, air force and the maritime coalition.¹⁰⁴

Belgium concluded [a ten-year bilateral security agreement](#) with Ukraine at the end of May 2024.¹⁰⁵

Further reading

- Federal Government, [Belgium supports Ukraine](#)

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian Government has provided widespread support to Ukrainian refugees, supplied humanitarian aid and supported Western-led sanctions against Russia.¹⁰⁶ Military support, however, has been complicated by the differing positions of the Bulgarian Government, Parliament and the President, Rumen Radev, who is widely opposed to the provision of lethal weaponry.

Details of the military assistance provided has remained classified but is widely thought to be old Soviet equipment that is being provided in in exchange for modernisation assistance from NATO allies.¹⁰⁷

In September 2024, Bulgarian Defence Minister, Atanas Zapryanov, said that only the surplus property of the Bulgarian armed forces is supplied to Ukraine and that "we are helping a victim of aggression".¹⁰⁸ Bulgaria has also joined the F-16 coalition.¹⁰⁹

Negotiations on long-term security guarantees between Bulgaria and Ukraine were launched at the end of October 2024.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ Minister of Foreign Affairs, [Press release](#), 25 August 2022

¹⁰⁴ Federal Government, [Belgian support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 4 July 2025)

¹⁰⁵ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on Security Cooperation and Long Term Support between the Kingdom of Belgium and Ukraine](#), 28 May 2024

¹⁰⁶ Balkan Insight, ["Bulgaria rejects Ukraine's plea for heavy weaponry"](#), 7 June 2022

¹⁰⁷ Euractiv, ["Bulgaria to gain over €500 million from military aid to Ukraine"](#), 7 February 2025

¹⁰⁸ BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, ["Defence Ministers says Bulgaria by no means involved in war through military aid to Ukraine"](#), 13 September 2024

¹⁰⁹ BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, ["Bulgaria will keep supporting Ukraine, first F-16 fighters expected in April"](#), 19 January 2025

¹¹⁰ President of Ukraine, Press release, 25 October 2024

Further reading

- BTA: Bulgarian News Agency, [#Ukraine](#)
- Bulgarian Government, [Bulgaria for Ukraine](#) (although it does not provide any information on military aid)

Canada

Canada has been providing bilateral non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine for several years and between 2015 and 2022 had a training and capacity building mission in Ukraine ([Operation Unifier](#)). Since February 2022 Canada has been providing Ukraine with lethal weaponry, including tanks, air defence systems and artillery.¹¹¹

To date, Canada has committed \$6.5 billion in military assistance which will allow for the provision of military assistance to Ukraine “through to 2029”.¹¹²

Canada is engaged in several multinational initiatives to urgently procure key capabilities and participates in several UDCG capability coalitions (see above), including armour, drones, IT and the air force coalition. In August 2025, Canada announced that it would provide \$500 million in funding for one of the first packages of military assistance established under the PURL mechanism (see above).¹¹³

Canada has extended Operation Unifier to March 2026.¹¹⁴ Personnel are deployed with the UK-led training programme Operation Interflex, and in Poland and Latvia to provide engineering, medical and junior officer training.¹¹⁵

An [agreement on long term security cooperation between Canada and Ukraine](#) was signed on 24 February 2024.

Further reading

- Government of Canada, [Canadian donations and military support to Ukraine](#)
- Government of Canada, [Canada’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine](#)

¹¹¹ Government of Canada, [Canada commits lethal weapons and ammunition in support of Ukraine](#), 14 February 2022.

¹¹² Canadian Armed Forces, [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 16 September 2024)

¹¹³ NATO, [Press release](#), 24 August 2025

¹¹⁴ Government of Canada, [Canadian military support to Ukraine](#), (accessed 13 January 2025)

¹¹⁵ Government of Canada, [Donations and military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 16 September 2024)

Croatia

As of February 2025, Croatia has provided €208 million in military assistance to Ukraine.¹¹⁶ The Croatian Government does not, however, make public what it provides in terms of specific capabilities.¹¹⁷

In October 2024, the Croatian Prime Minister signed an agreement on long-term security cooperation with Ukraine, with a specific emphasis on industrial cooperation and humanitarian demining.¹¹⁸ A Letter of Intent on the joint production of defence equipment was signed on 27 October 2025.¹¹⁹

Further reading

- Croatian Ministry of Defence, [Press releases](#)
- Government of the Republic of Croatia, [Croatia continues to strongly support Ukraine](#), June 2025

Czech Republic

As of October 2025, Czech military assistance to Ukraine is valued at approximately €714 million.¹²⁰

The Czech Republic has provided both lethal and non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine and has taken a leading role in establishing partnering arrangements with other countries to jointly finance projects and/or enable the purchase of equipment from Czech industry. In 2024, the Czech Government launched an initiative to provide Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of artillery shells sourced from suppliers outside of the EU and US.¹²¹ That initiative was joined by 18 countries who have jointly financed the project.¹²² Funding has been secured until the autumn of 2025.¹²³

In the longer term, the Czech Republic is also supporting the F-16 air force coalition and the drone coalition (see section 2.1 above).

In July 2024, the Czech Republic and Ukraine [concluded a bilateral agreement at the meeting of the European Political Community](#) in London.

¹¹⁶ Croatian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 13 February 2025

¹¹⁷ Ukrinform, [“Croatian PM: We will continue military support for Ukraine”](#), 13 January 2023

¹¹⁸ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on long-term cooperation and support between Ukraine and the Republic of Croatia](#), 9 October 2024

¹¹⁹ Croatia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 27 October 2025

¹²⁰ BRNO Daily, [“Czech Republic has donated CZK17.4 billion to Ukraine in military aid”](#), 21 October 2025

¹²¹ Euractiv, [“Czechia could send 800,000 ammunition units to Ukraine as funding secured”](#), 19 February 2024

¹²² Politico, [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#), 7 March 2024

¹²³ Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, [Press release](#), 14 April 2025

Future military assistance to Ukraine is currently unclear following the victory of the ANO party in parliamentary elections in October 2025. At the time of writing, the leader of the ANO, Andrej Babis, is in talks to form a new government.¹²⁴ Andrej Babis, and the ANO, have expressed opposition to military support for Ukraine, including the Czech-led ammunition initiative which Babis has previously said he will revoke.¹²⁵

Further reading

- Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, [Press releases](#)
- Government of the Czech Republic, [Support during the first year of the invasion](#), 23 February 2023

Denmark

As of September 2025, military support for Ukraine since February 2022 stands at €9 billion.¹²⁶

In March 2023, the Danish Government established the Danish National Ukraine Fund which will support military and civilian assistance to Ukraine through to 2028. After an uplift in funding in April 2024, €8.1 billion of that fund was earmarked for military assistance, including weapons and training.¹²⁷ €6.7 billion of that fund had been committed by the end of November 2024.¹²⁸ Denmark also contributes to the International Fund for Ukraine.¹²⁹

Denmark has provided both lethal and non-lethal military equipment, including anti-tank weapons, maritime capabilities, its entire inventory of artillery, BMP-2 and modernised T-72 tanks and associated munitions, and air defence missiles. It has established several joint procurement projects and taken a lead in financing weapons procurement, both from third countries, including the Czech ammunition initiative, and direct from the Ukrainian defence industry.¹³⁰ In September 2024, the Danish Ministry of Defence confirmed that it would manage €394.6 million of funding received under the EU's frozen assets windfall mechanism (see section 2) to aid Ukraine's defence

¹²⁴ Reuters, "[Czech president taps election winner Babis to lead government talks](#)", 27 October 2025

¹²⁵ European Council on Foreign Relations, "[Czechs and balances: Protecting Ukraine aid from the new government in Prague](#)", 7 October 2025

¹²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, [Danish support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

¹²⁷ As above

¹²⁸ Danish Ministry of Defence, [Danish military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 7 July 2025)

¹²⁹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 January 2025

¹³⁰ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 14 October 2022; Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 7 February 2023, Danish Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 19 September 2023 (in Danish) and Czech Ministry of Defense, [News release](#), 16 October 2023; Danish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#) (in Danish), 16 April 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, [Press release](#), 29 April 2024, [Press release](#), 17 May 2024, [Press release](#), 13 June 2024; [Press release](#), 19 June 2024; [Press release](#), 20 August 2024 and [Press release](#), 16 September 2024

industry.¹³¹ In August 2025, Denmark was one of the first countries to donate to the PURL initiative (see above).¹³²

Denmark was also the first country to donate F-16 aircraft to Ukraine and jointly leads, alongside the US and the Netherlands, the F-16 air force capability coalition (see section 2.1).¹³³ Denmark is also a member of the IT, drone, artillery, air defence, maritime and demining capability coalitions.¹³⁴

Denmark provides training to Ukrainian military personnel through the UK-led Operation Interflex and the EU training mission ([EUMAM Ukraine](#)).

On 23 February 2024, Denmark became one of the first non-G7 countries to sign [a 10-year security cooperation agreement](#) (PDF) with Ukraine.¹³⁵

Further reading

- Danish Ministry of Defence, [Danish Military support to Ukraine](#). This includes a full list of donated capabilities.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Danish support for Ukraine](#)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Denmark in Ukraine](#)

Estonia

Estonia was one of the first countries to provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance as Russia built up its forces on Ukraine's borders.¹³⁶

Total military aid stands at approximately €500 million.¹³⁷ In January 2024, the Estonian President, Alar Karis, pledged to allocate a further €1.2 billion for Ukrainian military assistance to 2027.¹³⁸ Military aid to Ukraine accounts for more than 1.4% of Estonia's gross domestic product (GDP).¹³⁹

Estonia is leading the long-term capability coalition on information security, in conjunction with Luxembourg and joined the drone capability coalition in February 2024.¹⁴⁰

¹³¹ Danish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 16 September 2024

¹³² NATO, [Press release](#), 5 August 2025

¹³³ Danish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 October 2023 and [Press release](#), 12 August 2024

¹³⁴ Danish Ministry of Defence, [Danish military support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 24 June 2024)

¹³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, [News release](#), 23 February 2024

¹³⁶ Reuters, "[U.S. clears Baltic states to send U.S.-made weapons to Ukraine](#)", 20 January 2022

¹³⁷ Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

¹³⁸ The Kyiv Independent, "[Estonia pledges \\$1.3 billion in long-term support for Kyiv as Zelenskyy tours Baltics](#)", 11 January 2024 and President of Ukraine, [Joint Press Conference](#), 11 January 2024

¹³⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#) (accessed 13 January 2025)

¹⁴⁰ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

Estonia and Ukraine concluded a long security cooperation agreement in June 2024.¹⁴¹

Further reading

- Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Estonia's aid to Ukraine](#)
- Estonian Ministry of Defence, [Press releases](#)

Finland

Finland joined NATO on 4 April 2023. Prior to this date Finland was providing extensive military assistance to Ukraine.

Military assistance, to date, totals approximately €2.9 billion.¹⁴² Initially focused on non-lethal equipment such as protective gear and medical supplies, Finnish support has evolved to the provision of lethal aid. Details have largely been withheld for security reasons. In May 2025, the Finnish Ministry of Defence confirmed that it had reached an agreement with the EU Commission to procure ammunition from Finnish suppliers, using the profits from frozen Russian assets.¹⁴³

Finland also contributes to the training programme for Ukrainian personnel that is being hosted by the UK (Operation Interflex).¹⁴⁴

Finland and Ukraine concluded a bilateral security cooperation agreement on 3 April 2024.¹⁴⁵

Further reading

- Ministry of Defence, [Russian attack on Ukraine and Finland's support](#)
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs, [Finland's support to Ukraine](#)

France

Before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, France had only provided humanitarian aid and budgetary support to the country. It announced its decision to

¹⁴¹ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation and long term support between Ukraine and Estonia](#), 27 June 2024

¹⁴² Ministry of Defence, [Russia's attack on Ukraine and Finland's support](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

¹⁴³ Finnish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 May 2025

¹⁴⁴ Finnish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 8 August 2022

¹⁴⁵ President of the Republic of Finland, [Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between the Republic of Finland and Ukraine](#), 3 April 2024

provide defensive weaponry the day after Russia launched military action in Ukraine.¹⁴⁶

French assistance has included anti-tank missile systems, air defence systems, drones, armoured vehicles, artillery and munitions. In July 2023, President Macron announced the decision to send [long-range SCALP \(Storm Shadow\) missiles to](#) Ukraine.¹⁴⁷ After several months of controversy over the use of long-range strike against targets in Russia, in November 2024, French Foreign Minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, confirmed that French-supplied long-range missiles could be fired into Russia “in the logic of self-defence”. He also said that there were no “red lines” in French support for Ukraine and that no option should be “discarded”, including, potentially, French troops on the ground.¹⁴⁸ France has also supplied Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage-2000 fighter jets, which will operate alongside the F-16 coalition fleet.¹⁴⁹ Questions have been raised by analysts, however, over the long-term ability of Ukraine to operate and maintain a fighter jet fleet with more than one aircraft variant.¹⁵⁰

Since early 2023, France has also financed Ukraine’s procurement of equipment directly from French industry and established agreements for the joint production of spare parts and maintenance of equipment.¹⁵¹ In September 2024 the French Ministry of Defence confirmed that €300 million raised from the profits of immobilised Russian assets would be used to urgently procure ammunition, artillery and air defence capabilities from the French defence industry.¹⁵² France has also given financial support to the Czech ammunition initiative.¹⁵³

French personnel are contributing to the UK training programme for Ukrainian marines.¹⁵⁴ It is also jointly leading the capability coalitions that have been established on ground-based air defence and artillery, in conjunction with Germany and the US respectively.

¹⁴⁶ CNN, “[France will provide defensive equipment to Ukraine](#)”, 25 February 2022.

¹⁴⁷ France 24, “[A strong gesture: French delivery of SCALP missiles to Ukraine marks shift in Western strategy](#)”, 13 July 2023 and Defense News, “[France to give Ukraine more cruise missiles, plans security pact](#)”, 17 January 2024. This capability is also being provided by the UK.

¹⁴⁸ BBC News, “[‘No red lines’ in Ukraine support French foreign ministers tells BBC](#)”, 23 November 2024. The debate over permission to use long range missiles against Russian targets is examined in Library research briefing, [Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion \(February 2022 to January 2025\)](#)

¹⁴⁹ Politico, “[France will send Mirage fighters jets to Ukraine, Macron says](#)”, 6 June 2024

¹⁵⁰ See Breaking Defense, “[French Mirage-2000 fighters are headed to Ukraine. Here’s how Kyiv will use them](#)”, 13 June 2024

¹⁵¹ Euronews, “[French defence minister promises more military support for Ukraine](#)”, 28 December 2022; Le Monde, “[France organises long term military support for Ukraine](#)”, 1 February 2023; Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2021-2023), @olekksiireznikov, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 11 July 2023 (accessed 14 July 2023); Politico Morning Defense, 8 November 2023 and Ministry of the Armed Forces, [Press release](#), 2 October 2023 (in French)

¹⁵² French Ministry of Defense, [Communiqué de Presse](#) (PDF) (in French), 6 September 2024

¹⁵³ Politico, “[Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine](#)”, 7 March 2024

¹⁵⁴ [UK-France Joint Leader’s Declaration](#), 10 March 2023

France and Ukraine signed a [10-year security cooperation agreement](#) in February 2024. As outlined above, France is also working with the UK on establishing a multinational force that will support any future peace agreement (see section 2.1).

Figures for French assistance to Ukraine are not routinely published. In September 2025, the French media outlet France 24 reported that forthcoming government figures outlined €8.6 billion in military and financial aid to Ukraine since 2022. That figure includes €5.9 billion for weapons transfers, maintenance and training and €2.7 billion for financial support, primarily France's contribution to the European Peace Facility.¹⁵⁵

Further reading

- Ministry for the Armed Forces, [French military equipment delivered to Ukraine](#), March 2024. This list is inclusive to the end of 2023 and was published in response to early [criticisms of the level of French assistance](#) being provided to Ukraine.

Germany

After initial reluctance to provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance, amid concerns that it would provoke Russia and hamper the diplomatic process, Germany has become one of the largest donors of lethal military aid to Ukraine.¹⁵⁶ That assistance has continued under the government of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, which took office in May 2025.¹⁵⁷

At the time of writing, €38 billion in military assistance has either been spent since February 2022 or has been committed to support Ukraine over the next few years.¹⁵⁸

Among other things, Germany has provided anti-tank weapons, air defence systems including Patriots, infantry fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, artillery, drones and ammunition.

In 2024, the German government launched an air defence initiative to urgently “find or finance” more air defence systems for Ukraine.¹⁵⁹ More than \$1 billion in financial support had reportedly been pledged to the initiative by

¹⁵⁵ France 24, [“From weapons to military training: Tracking French support for Ukraine”](#), 19 September 2025

¹⁵⁶ BBC News, [“Why Germany isn’t sending weapons to Ukraine”](#), 29 January 2022 and Deutsche Welle, [“Why Germany refuses weapons deliveries to Ukraine”](#), 19 January 2022.)

¹⁵⁷ BBC News, [“German chancellor promises to help Ukraine produce long-range weapons”](#), 28 May 2025

¹⁵⁸ Federal Government, [How Germany is supporting Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

¹⁵⁹ Politico, [“Germany targets air defense ramp up as Berlin corrals allies behind Ukraine”](#), 21 April 2024 and The Financial Times, [“Germany urges dozens of allies to send air defence systems to Ukraine”](#), 17 April 2024

mid-2024.¹⁶⁰ Germany has reportedly been in discussions with the US Department of Defense over the purchase of two Patriot air defence systems, which may now form part of the new US military assistance to Ukraine that was announced on 14 July 2025.¹⁶¹ In August 2025, Germany confirmed that it would fund one of the first military assistance packages established under the PURL initiative.¹⁶²

Germany is also leading the long-term capability coalitions on ground-based air defence (jointly with France) and armour and has joined the drone capability coalition.¹⁶³ In January 2025, Germany committed funding, for the first time, to the International Fund for Ukraine, specifically in relation to the provision of maritime training.

The government continues to rule out the provision of Taurus long-range missiles.¹⁶⁴ In May 2025, however, Chancellor Merz said that Germany would finance the production of long-range weapons in Ukraine.¹⁶⁵

The German government has also been working with allies in eastern and southern Europe to facilitate the delivery of their Soviet-era equipment to Ukraine, in exchange for German equipment and has joined the Czech ammunition initiative.¹⁶⁶

[A 10-year agreement](#) on security assurances was signed with Ukraine on 16 February 2024.

Further reading

- Federal Government, [How Germany is supporting Ukraine](#)
- [Military support for Ukraine](#). No longer updated since April 2025.
- Federal Foreign Office, [For as long as it takes: Germany's support for Ukraine](#)

Greece

Greece has said it will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes”, and has provided lethal weaponry, including Soviet-era infantry fighting vehicles and other weaponry such as air defence missiles, no longer in use by the Greek

¹⁶⁰ The White House, [Joint Statement](#), 9 July 2024

¹⁶¹ Politico, [“Germany in talks with the US to buy Patriot systems for Ukraine”](#), 4 July 2025

¹⁶² NATO, [Press release](#), 13 August 2025

¹⁶³ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024)

¹⁶⁴ Politico, [“Germany commits to €1.9B in Ukraine military aid”](#), 12 June 2025

¹⁶⁵ BBC News, [“German chancellor promises to help Ukraine produce long-range weapons”](#), 28 May 2025

¹⁶⁶ The Kyiv Independent, [“Czech Republic to deliver thousands of extra artillery shells to Ukraine”](#), The Guardian, 19 March 2024

armed forces.¹⁶⁷ The Greek Government has previously ruled out the provision of Patriot air defence systems to Ukraine, saying that “these systems are critical to our deterrent capability”.¹⁶⁸

Greece has given the US priority access to the Port of Alexandroupolis to facilitate the US’s provision of military assistance to Ukraine,¹⁶⁹ and has joined the F-16 capability coalition.¹⁷⁰

As of July 2024, Greek military assistance to Ukraine has been estimated at €300 million.¹⁷¹

In October 2024, Greece and Ukraine signed an agreement on long term security cooperation.¹⁷²

Hungary

Hungary does not support the provision of weaponry to Ukraine and does not allow lethal weapons bound for Ukraine to transit its territory.¹⁷³

Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, continues to block further tranches of military assistance to Ukraine under the EU’s European Peace Facility.¹⁷⁴ The EU has, however, reached a deal (without Hungary) for military support using the profits of immobilised Russian assets (see section 2).

In mid-June 2024 Mr Orbán also dropped his opposition to Mark Rutte’s appointment as NATO Secretary General, reportedly in exchange for promises that Hungary would be able to opt out of future NATO military support for Ukraine.¹⁷⁵

Iceland

Iceland does not have its own armed forces and therefore is not in a position to donate military equipment. It has, however, been helping deliver equipment to Ukraine from other allies, and it has provided field hospitals,

¹⁶⁷ Politico, “[Germany announces new deal with Greece to send tanks to Ukraine](#)”, 31 May 2022; Ekathimerini, “[Blinken’s letter to Mr Mitsotakis on the F-35 and defense cooperation](#)”, 27 January 2024 and “[Greece to send Sea Sparrows to Ukraine](#)”, 28 December 2024

¹⁶⁸ “[Greece rules out air defence systems to Ukraine, Prime Minister says](#)”, Reuters, 26 April 2024

¹⁶⁹ DoD news, “[Strategic port access aid support to Ukraine, Austin tells Greek Defense Minister](#)”, 18 July 2022

¹⁷⁰ Radio Free Europe, “[Greece promises support for F-16s, Ukraine reconstruction during Zelenskyy visit](#)”, 21 August 2023

¹⁷¹ Al Jazeera, “[Russian anger builds as Greece prepares a military deal with Ukraine](#)”, 16 July 2024

¹⁷² President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 17 October 2024

¹⁷³ Reuters, “[Hungary will not allow lethal weapons for Ukraine to transit its territory – FM](#)”, 28 February 2022 and BBC News, “[Macron says Russian defeat in Ukraine vital for security in Europe](#)”, 27 February 2024

¹⁷⁴ At the European Council meeting on 27 June 2024, EU leaders called on the Council to “swiftly finalise work on the European Peace Facility assistance measures that will further incentivise the delivery of military support to Ukraine” (European Council, [Conclusions](#) (PDF), EUCO15/24, June 2024

¹⁷⁵ The Financial Times, “[Rutte clears biggest hurdle for NATO top job after winning Orbán’s backing](#)”, 18 June 2024

winter clothing and medical supplies as well as combat medical training (with the UK and the Netherlands) and explosive ordnance disposal training (with Lithuania and the Nordic countries).¹⁷⁶ Iceland is leading the demining capability coalition, alongside Lithuania, and has joined the IT coalition.¹⁷⁷

Iceland also contributes financially to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine, NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package, the International Fund for Ukraine and the Czech ammunition initiative.¹⁷⁸

At the time of writing, Iceland's military assistance is estimated at €21 million.¹⁷⁹ In April 2024, Iceland confirmed that it will commit €26.8 million each year to support Ukraine up to 2028, although the distribution between military and civilian support will be determined on an annual basis.¹⁸⁰

Iceland and Ukraine signed an agreement on long-term security cooperation in May 2024.¹⁸¹

Further reading

- Government of Iceland, [War in Ukraine – Iceland's response](#)

Italy

Successive Italian governments have expressed their long-term support for Ukraine, providing a range of lethal and non-lethal weaponry, including armoured vehicles, artillery and air defence systems.¹⁸² In 2024, Italy joined the IT capability coalition.¹⁸³

The Italian Government has not provided an economic value for its military assistance to Ukraine, but it is estimated by analysts to be in the region of \$1

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 June 2023; Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, @MoD_Estonia, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 22 June 2023 (accessed 14 July 2023)

¹⁷⁷ Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 13 June 2024

¹⁷⁸ Government of Iceland, [War in Ukraine – Iceland's response](#) (accessed 7 July 2025)

¹⁷⁹ Government of Iceland, [War in Ukraine – Iceland's response](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

¹⁸⁰ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and Iceland](#), 31 May 2024

¹⁸¹ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and Iceland](#), 31 May 2024

¹⁸² Center for European Policy Analysis, ["Italy's unwavering support for Ukraine"](#), 22 June 2022; The Financial Times, ["Italy to join forces with France in supplying air defences to Ukraine"](#), The Financial Times, 1 February 2023 and The White House, [Joint Statement](#), 9 July 2024

¹⁸³ Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

billion to \$2 billion by mid-2024.¹⁸⁴ A further \$1.5 billion has reportedly been agreed for 2025.¹⁸⁵

Italy, as a member of the G7, has committed to provide Ukraine with long term security guarantees and signed [a 10-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine](#) (PDF) on 24 February 2024.

Further reading

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, [Italy in support of Ukraine](#)
- [Joint Declaration by Ukraine and Italy](#), 13 May 2023

Latvia

Latvia began providing lethal weapons in January 2022, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¹⁸⁶ That assistance has included, among other things, air defence missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery, helicopters and ammunition.¹⁸⁷

Latvia is leading the drone coalition, in partnership with the UK. In early 2024, Latvia also joined the IT coalition.¹⁸⁸

The Ministry of Defence has also been working in partnership with the NGO, Entrepreneurs for Peace, to provide Ukraine with further non-lethal assistance.¹⁸⁹

As of January 2025, military assistance was an estimated €540 million.¹⁹⁰ At least €20 million has been provided in support of the drone capability coalition.¹⁹¹ A further €20 million in military support has come from private donations.¹⁹²

The Ministry of Defence has said that the focus for 2025 will comprise procurement from Latvian industry, a €20 million contribution to the drone

¹⁸⁴ Center for European Policy Analysis, "[Partners in arms: Italy-Ukraine defense cooperation](#)", 16 July 2024

¹⁸⁵ Euromaidan Press, "[Yes, Italy is arming Ukraine – here's what military aid data shows](#)", 20 April 2025

¹⁸⁶ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia delivers "Stinger" anti-aircraft missile system to Ukraine](#), 23 February 2022.

¹⁸⁷ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 August 2022; Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023 and Ukrainska Pravda, "[Latvia's new aid package to include armoured vehicles and UAVs](#)", 11 September 2024

¹⁸⁸ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024 and Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024

¹⁸⁹ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 August 2022

¹⁹⁰ Cabinet of Ministers, [Latvia supports Ukraine](#) (accessed 8 July 2025)

¹⁹¹ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Support for Ukraine](#) (accessed 17 September 2024)

¹⁹² Cabinet of Ministers, [Latvia supports Ukraine](#) (accessed 17 September 2024)

capability coalition, training of Ukrainian soldiers and support to Ukraine from other government ministries.¹⁹³

Latvia and Ukraine concluded [a bilateral agreement on security cooperation and long-term support](#) on 11 April 2024.

Further reading

- Ministry of Defence, [Support for Ukraine](#)
- Cabinet of Ministers, [Latvia supports Ukraine](#)

Lithuania

Lithuania began providing lethal weapons to Ukraine in January 2022.¹⁹⁴

Capabilities include missiles, anti-tank weapons, armoured vehicles, drones, maritime surveillance radar, attack helicopters and air defence systems.¹⁹⁵

Lithuania is leading the demining capability coalition, alongside Iceland, and most of the €200 million earmarked for Ukrainian assistance to 2026, will support this coalition.¹⁹⁶ Lithuania has also provided financing for the Czech ammunition initiative, the German air defence initiative and the International Fund for Ukraine.¹⁹⁷ Lithuania has also joined the drone and IT capability coalitions.

Since the end of 2024 Lithuania has also been increasing its support to Ukraine's defence industry, particularly the domestic manufacture of long-range drones.¹⁹⁸ In 2025, expanding defence production cooperation with Ukraine has been identified as a "key priority".¹⁹⁹

Lithuania has also been providing training to Ukrainian military instructors in anti-tank weaponry and is participating in the UK's Operation Interflex.

¹⁹³ Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 14 January 2025)

¹⁹⁴ Reuters, "[U.S. clears Baltic states to send U.S.-made weapons to Ukraine](#)", 20 January 2022

¹⁹⁵ Ministry of National Republic of Lithuania, [Lithuania renders military assistance to Ukraine](#), 24 February 2022; LRT, "[Lithuania has provided €200 million in military aid to war torn Ukraine](#)", 14 September 2022; Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, [Press release](#), 24 August 2023 and [Press release](#), 20 December 2023; The Defense Post, "[Ukraine to receive Lithuanian military aid](#)", 12 August 2024; Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, [@Lithuanian_MoD](#), X (formerly Twitter), 24 November 2024 (accessed 14 January 2025)

¹⁹⁶ Ministry of National Defence, [Press release](#), 10 January 2024

¹⁹⁷ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 January 2023 and Politico, "[Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine](#)", 7 March 2024; Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024); Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024; Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 May 2024 and [Press release](#), 13 June 2024

¹⁹⁸ President of Ukraine, [News release](#), 12 September 2024 and Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 5 November 2024

¹⁹⁹ The Kyiv Independent, "[Lithuania delivers new military aid package to Ukraine](#)", 25 November 2024

As of February 2025, total Lithuanian military assistance to Ukraine was approximately €769 million and is expected to reach €1 billion by the end of 2025.²⁰⁰

Ukraine and Lithuania concluded an [agreement on long term security cooperation](#) in June 2024.

Luxembourg

To date, Luxembourg has provided Ukraine with €259 million in military assistance. Assistance in 2025 has been set at €120 million.²⁰¹

Assistance has included ammunition, artillery, anti-tank missiles, Humvee light vehicles, drones and non-lethal protective equipment.²⁰²

In conjunction with Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg has been financing the procurement of additional drones for Ukraine.²⁰³ The focus for 2025 will be on supporting Ukrainian domestic defence production, including drones, surveillance and electronic warfare systems.²⁰⁴

Luxembourg has joined the F-16 air force training coalition, the artillery coalition, the drone coalition and is jointly leading the IT coalition on with Estonia.²⁰⁵ It also supports Ukraine through NATO's Comprehensive Assistance package.

Luxembourg and Ukraine concluded an agreement on long term security cooperation in July 2024.²⁰⁶

Montenegro

Since March 2022, Montenegro has donated both non-lethal and lethal military equipment to Ukraine, primarily mortars, anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition.²⁰⁷

Along with humanitarian aid, in February 2025 that assistance was estimated at over €10 million.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁰ Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 February 2025

²⁰¹ Dnipropetrovsk Investment Agency, [Luxembourg's contribution to Ukraine's rebuilding](#), June 2025

²⁰² Luxembourg Government, [Press release: François Bausch announces military assistance and support measures for Ukraine](#), 28 February 2022 and The Luxembourg Times, ["Luxembourg to provide Ukraine more military aid"](#), 15 February 2023

²⁰³ RBC-Ukraine, ["Luxembourg joins artillery coalition, commits to drone purchases for Ukraine"](#), 19 March 2024

²⁰⁴ Bulgarian Military, ["Small nation: big impact: Luxembourg pledges €80m for Ukraine weapons"](#), 30 November 2024

²⁰⁵ [Statement on a Joint Coalition on F-16 Training of the Ukrainian Air Force](#), July 2023 and Luxembourg Chronicle, ["Luxembourg to provide €69m military aid to Ukraine in 2024"](#), 20 March 2024

²⁰⁶ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg](#), 10 July 2024

²⁰⁷ N1, ["Montenegro joins EU sanctions against Russia, moves to send aid to Ukraine"](#), 2 March 2022

²⁰⁸ Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, [Op-ed](#), 24 February 2025

In June 2025, Montenegro's Parliament approved participation in the EU military training mission for Ukraine.²⁰⁹ Montenegro also contributes to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine and has signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²¹⁰ Negotiations on an agreement began in August 2024.²¹¹

Netherlands

To the end of 2024, the Netherlands provided €4.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine, including financial contributions to the International Fund for Ukraine and the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package.²¹² The government has said that a further €9 billion in military assistance has also been committed.²¹³

Dutch assistance to Ukraine began just prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as Russian military forces built up on Ukraine's borders.²¹⁴ Further tranches of assistance have included anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition, Patriot air defence systems, anti-tank weapons, artillery, armoured vehicles, two minehunter vessels, and F-16 aircraft.²¹⁵ The Netherlands has also partnered the US, Germany, Czech Republic and Denmark to provide refurbished main battle tanks.²¹⁶

The Netherlands has also financed several procurement initiatives, including the Czech ammunition project and the German-led initiative on air defence, and has entered into agreements with the Czech defence industry to purchase artillery.²¹⁷ In August 2025, the Netherlands was the first NATO ally to commit to funding the first package of military assistance under the PURL mechanism.²¹⁸

The Netherlands is jointly leading the F-16 coalition and has provided 24 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine, the last of which was delivered in May 2025. A package of support, including training, spare parts, ammunition and fuel, will continue.²¹⁹ The Netherlands has also joined the IT and drone capability coalitions.²²⁰

²⁰⁹ Balkan Insight, "[Montenegro approves troop deployment to EU mission supporting Ukraine](#)", 12 June 2025

²¹⁰ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

²¹¹ Government of Montenegro, [Press release](#), 30 August 2024

²¹² Government of the Netherlands, [Dutch aid for Ukraine](#) (accessed 9 July 2025)

²¹³ Government of the Netherlands, [The Netherlands' assistance to Ukraine 2022- 2025](#)

²¹⁴ Government of the Netherlands, [Press release](#), 18 February 2022

²¹⁵ A full list of announcements is available at: Ministry of Defense, [What is the Netherlands doing? Day by day](#) (accessed 8 July 2025)

²¹⁶ [Joint Statement by the United States Department of Defense, the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic \(PDF\)](#), 4 November 2022; Netherlands Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 7 February 2023 and [Press release](#), 20 April 2023

²¹⁷ Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#) (in Dutch), 17 October 2024

²¹⁸ NATO, [Press release](#), 4 August 2025

²¹⁹ Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 26 May 2025

²²⁰ Latvian Ministry of Defence, [Latvia's support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 21 February 2024) and Estonia Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 19 March 2024; Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#) (in Dutch), 6 October 2024 and [Press release](#) (in Dutch), 18 October 2024

The Netherlands participates in the UK-led training programme for Ukrainian personnel and is working, in conjunction with the UK and Iceland on the delivery of combat medical training to Ukrainian personnel.²²¹

In February 2024, the Netherlands became [one of the first non-G7 countries to sign a long-term security cooperation agreement](#) with Ukraine.²²²

Further reading

- Ministry of Defense, [What is the Netherlands doing? From day to day](#) (in Dutch)
- Government of the Netherlands, [Dutch aid for Ukraine](#)
- Government of the Netherlands, [The Netherlands' assistance to Ukraine 2022-2025](#) (PDF), June 2025

North Macedonia

At the beginning of March 2022, the North Macedonian Government announced that it would donate military materiel and equipment to Ukraine.²²³ That equipment has included Soviet-era T-72 tanks, non-airworthy Su-25 aircraft (presumably for spare parts or refurbishment) and 12 Mi-24 attack helicopters.²²⁴

In December 2023 the government reportedly refused further Ukrainian requests for military donations, saying that the equipment was required for its own armed forces. It did confirm, however, its willingness to extend its training programme for Ukrainian soldiers, that had, until November 2023, remained confidential.²²⁵

In October 2024, the Ukrainian Government said the level of North Macedonian military assistance, per capita, placed it in the top four contributors among NATO countries.²²⁶

North Macedonia has also signed the G7 Joint Declaration setting out long term security guarantees to Ukraine.²²⁷

²²¹ Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 24 June 2023

²²² Government of the Netherlands, [Press release](#), 23 February 2024

²²³ Government of North Macedonia, [Press release](#), 2 March 2022

²²⁴ Radio Free Europe, [“Ukrainians thank North Macedonia for supply of Soviet-era tanks”](#), 6 August 2022; Jane’s Defence Weekly, [“North Macedonia confirms transfer of Su-25s to Ukraine, Mi-24 attack helicopters may follow”](#), 20 March 2023 and Defense Express, [“North Macedonia delivered 12 Mi-24 helicopters to Ukraine’s armed forces in 2023”](#), 10 January 2025

²²⁵ Balkan Insight, [“North Macedonia completes training first batch of Ukrainian soldiers”](#), 22 November 2023 and The Geopost, [“North Macedonia will not donate military equipment to Ukraine”](#), 29 December 2023

²²⁶ Ukrainian Investment Agency, [Press release](#), 3 October 2024

²²⁷ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023

Norway

Norway has had a longstanding principle of not supplying weapons and ammunition to conflict zones.²²⁸ In February 2022, however, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre announced a change of policy which would allow Norway to send both defensive and offensive weapons to Ukraine.²²⁹

Capabilities have included anti tanks weapons, [NASAMS air defence systems](#), self-propelled artillery and associated munitions, multiple launch rocket systems, ammunition, armoured vehicles, Leopard 2 tanks and F-16 aircraft.²³⁰ Norway has also been working closely with allies to either provide, or co-finance the production of, artillery, air defence systems, long-range multiple rocket launch systems and drones.²³¹ Norway provides funding to the International Fund for Ukraine and is also contributing to the Czech ammunition initiative and the German air defence initiative.²³² In August 2025, Norway was one of the first countries to commit funding to the PURL initiative.²³³

Norway has joined [the F-16 coalition](#) and is leading, alongside the UK, the maritime capability coalition.²³⁴ Norway also contributes personnel to the UK-led basic training programme for Ukrainian personnel and the EU training mission.

Military aid to Ukraine is funded through [the Nansen Programme](#), which covers both civilian and military assistance. The programme has a total budget of NOK 205 billion (€17.3 billion) between 2023 and 2030.²³⁵ The distribution of military and civilian funding varies each year and is determined by Ukraine's needs.²³⁶ For 2025, the Norwegian parliament initially allocated NOK35 billion, of which NOK22.5 billion (€1.9 billion) was for military aid.²³⁷ In April 2025, that budget was increased by a further NOK50 billion (€4.2

²²⁸ Norwegian Church Aid & Amnesty International Norway, [Bullets Without Borders: Improving control and oversight over Norwegian arms production, exports and investments](#) (pdf 2,38 MB), 2006, See Box 2.1.

²²⁹ Norwegian Government, [Press release: Norway to provide weapons to Ukraine](#), 28 February 2022, accessed 21 March 2022.

²³⁰ Norwegian government, [Norwegian support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries](#) (accessed 23 January 2024)

²³¹ US Department of Defense, [Press release](#), 14 October 2022; Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 29 June 2022 and [Press release](#), 24 August 2022 and Government of Norway, [Norwegian support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 23 January 2024) and Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 29 October 2024

²³² Politico, [“Czechs raise funds to buy 800,000 artillery shells for Ukraine”](#), 7 March 2024 and Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 11 July 2024; Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 3 September 2024 and Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 January 2025

²³³ NATO, [Press release](#), 5 August 2025

²³⁴ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 9 July 2024 and [Press release](#), 30 October 2024

²³⁵ The financial framework for the programme has been increased several times since it was established in 2023.

²³⁶ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 16 February 2023

²³⁷ Government on Norway, [Press release](#), 28 November 2024

billion), which will be allocated entirely to military assistance.²³⁸ Total military aid in 2025 is now NOK72.5 billion (€6.1 billion).

That additional funding will be channelled through international initiatives, such as the International Fund for Ukraine, and be used to support procurement from the Ukrainian defence industry. Priority will be given to air defence systems, artillery ammunition, drones and maritime capabilities.²³⁹

An agreement between Ukraine and Norway on long-term security assurances was concluded on 31 May 2024.²⁴⁰

Further reading

- Government of Norway, [Norwegian support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries](#)
- Norad, [The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine](#)

Poland

Poland has been supplying defensive lethal weaponry to Ukraine since the end of January 2022.

Poland has been the main supplier of heavy weaponry to Ukraine, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and ammunition.²⁴¹ It has also established a Leopard 2 tank maintenance centre in Poland to support the sustainment of Leopard 2 tanks in theatre in Ukraine. Poland has also supplied air defence missiles and was the first NATO country to provide combat aircraft (MiG-29 fighter jets).²⁴² Poland has also joined the F-16 capability coalition.

Under the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the focus of assistance has shifted toward the provision of loans for arms purchases and the joint production of weapons.²⁴³

²³⁸ Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 4 April 2025

²³⁹ As above

²⁴⁰ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on Security Cooperation and Long Term Support between Ukraine and the Kingdom of Norway](#), 31 May 2024

²⁴¹ Notes from Poland, [“Poland has given Ukraine military aid worth at least \\$1.7bn, expects allies to fill the gaps”](#), 15 June 2022 and CTV News, [“Polish PM applauds West for sending tanks to Ukraine”](#), 27 January 2023

²⁴² Radio Free Europe, [“Poland transfers 10 fighter jets ahead of expected counteroffensive”](#), 8 May 2023

²⁴³ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 22 January 2024

Poland has also been acting as a logistical hub for the transfer of military equipment from other allies into the western part of Ukraine not occupied by Russian forces.²⁴⁴

As of February 2025, Polish military assistance to Ukraine had been valued at €3.5 billion.²⁴⁵

Poland and Ukraine signed a long-term bilateral security cooperation agreement on 8 July 2024.²⁴⁶

1 Further reading

- Polish National Security Bureau, [Poland's aid to Ukraine](#)

Portugal

Portugal has been providing lethal and non-lethal military aid since the early phases of the conflict. Assistance includes armoured vehicles, drones, artillery, helicopters and main battle tanks.²⁴⁷

Portugal has joined the F-16 training coalition and the maritime coalition being led by the UK and Norway.²⁴⁸ It has also joined the Czech initiative to urgently supply artillery ammunition and committed funding to the International Fund for Ukraine and the NATO comprehensive assistance package trust fund.²⁴⁹

Portugal takes part in the EU's training mission and has also offered to train Ukrainian personnel in demining and unexploded ordnance disposal.²⁵⁰

Portugal and Ukraine agreed a bilateral security cooperation agreement on 28 May 2024.²⁵¹

Portugal has committed more than €220 million in military support over the course of 2024. The same has been earmarked for 2025.²⁵² The total value of military assistance is unclear.

²⁴⁴ Euractiv, "[Poland 'key' in Western weapons supplies to Ukraine](#)", 1 March 2022.

²⁴⁵ Polish National Security Bureau, [Poland's aid to Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

²⁴⁶ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland](#), 8 July 2024

²⁴⁷ Portuguese Ministry of Defence, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (PDF), March 2025

²⁴⁸ Euractiv, "[Portugal offers Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilots training, no jets](#)", 23 May 2023

²⁴⁹ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on Security Cooperation between Ukraine and Portugal](#), 28 May 2024; Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 January 2025 and Portuguese Ministry of Defence, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (PDF), March 2025

²⁵⁰ Government of Portugal, [Press release](#), 15 June 2022

²⁵¹ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on Security Cooperation between Ukraine and Portugal](#), 28 May 2024

²⁵² Government of Portugal, [Press release](#), 10 July 2024

Further reading

- Portuguese Government Portal, [Portuguese support for Ukraine](#)
- Portuguese Ministry of Defence, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (PDF), March 2025

Romania

In April 2022, amendments were made to the country's statute book to allow arms to be supplied not just to NATO allies, but also to partner countries.²⁵³

While military assistance has been ongoing, details are scarce, including on the value of aid. With the assistance of allies, Romania has contributed a Patriot air defence system and has been hosting military training.²⁵⁴ It has offered its military bases to instructors from allied countries and in November 2023 opened an F-16 European training hub at an airbase in the south-east of the country.²⁵⁵

Romania is also acting as a transit country for military equipment and supplies from allies.

Romania concluded a bilateral agreement on security cooperation with Ukraine in July 2024.²⁵⁶

Romania's new President, Nicusor Dan, has pledged to continue providing military support to Ukraine.²⁵⁷

Slovakia

Slovakia has been a significant supplier of military equipment to Ukraine, having provided €671 million in military aid between February 2022 and October 2023.²⁵⁸ Equipment has included artillery, ammunition, anti-tank missiles, Soviet-era infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, and its

²⁵³ _Prensa Latina, "[Romania to modify its laws to deliver weapons to Ukraine](#)", 19 April 2022

²⁵⁴ The White House, [Joint Statement](#), 9 July 2024; Government of Norway, [Press release](#), 29 October 2024 and Radio Free Europe, "[From neighbours to power partners: Romania's deepening ties with Ukraine](#)", 22 October 2024

²⁵⁵ In November 2022, Romania bought 32 F-16 aircraft from Norway and will use the hub to train both domestic pilots and those of the Ukrainian air force (Reuters, "[Romania opens F-16 pilot training hub for NATO allies, Ukraine](#)", 13 November 2023 and Radio Free Europe, "[Romania inaugurates F-16 pilot training hub for NATO allies and Ukraine](#)", 14 November 2023

²⁵⁶ President of Romania, [Agreement on security cooperation between Romania and Ukraine](#), 11 July 2024

²⁵⁷ AA, "[Romania's President-elect pledges continued support for Ukraine](#)", 22 May 2025

²⁵⁸ Politico, "[Slovakia enables arms exports to Ukraine as Fico completes backflip](#)", 16 January 2024

fleet of Soviet-era MiG-29 combat aircraft.²⁵⁹ Slovakia has also been operating a repair hub for damaged Ukrainian military vehicles.

Following the election of Prime Minister Robert Fico in September 2023, bilateral military assistance to Ukraine ended.²⁶⁰ The government has, however, maintained the repair hub and said that it would not prevent arms deliveries direct from the Slovakian defence industry.²⁶¹

In April 2024 the government also said that it would not join the Czech-led initiative on the procurement of ammunition. In response, a crowdfunding campaign was established to which the Slovakian public had donated over €1 million in less than 48 hours.²⁶²

Slovenia

Slovenia has provided both lethal and non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine since the end of February 2022. While details remain largely classified, that equipment is reported to have included drones, ammunition, large numbers of Soviet-era tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.²⁶³

Increasingly there has been a shift in focus toward the provision of humanitarian aid, and in particular de-mining assistance.²⁶⁴ In March 2024, the Slovenian Ministry of Defence confirmed that it donated €1 million to the Czech ammunition initiative.²⁶⁵ Slovenia also participates in the EU training mission for Ukraine.

Slovenia and Ukraine concluded a bilateral security cooperation agreement in July 2024.²⁶⁶

Spain

On 28 February 2022, the Spanish Government said that Spain would be prepared to send defensive military equipment to Ukraine, but ruled out sending offensive weapons, in part due to opposition from within the ruling

²⁵⁹ Reuters, [“Czech, Slovak governments increase military aid to Ukraine”](#), 27 February 2022; Euractiv, [“Slovakia to send combat vehicles to Ukraine in exchange for German tanks”](#), 24 August 2022; Ukrinform, [“Slovakia approves new military aid package for Ukraine”](#), 8 December 2022 and Defense News, [“US offers helicopters to Slovakia for giving jets to Ukraine”](#), 22 March 2023

²⁶⁰ Defense News, [“Slovakia shift, elections in Poland dampen support for Ukraine”](#), 3 October 2023

²⁶¹ NATO, [Press release](#), 14 December 2023; The Financial Times, [“Slovakia’s Prime Minister u-turns on Ukraine support during visit”](#), 24 January 2024 and Politico, [“Slovakia enables arms exports to Ukraine as Fico completes backflip”](#), 16 January 2024

²⁶² BBC News, [“After their PM halts Ukraine aid, Slovaks dig deep to help”](#), 19 April 2024

²⁶³ Slovenia News, [“Slovenia sending tanks to Ukraine in weapons swap with Germany”](#), 21 April 2022; TASS, [“Slovenia to supply 28 M-55S tanks to Ukraine”](#), 20 September 2022; Defense News, [“Slovenian firm quietly provides surveillance drones to Ukraine”](#), 26 October 2023 and Kyiv Independent, [“Slovenia secretly provided Ukraine with military supplies during US aid delay”](#), 13 June 2024

²⁶⁴ Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 4 December 2023

²⁶⁵ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, [@MO_RS, X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 15 March 2024 (accessed 26 March 2024)

²⁶⁶ President of Ukraine, [Agreement on security cooperation and long-term support between Ukraine and Republic of Slovenia](#), 18 July 2024

coalition. However, after criticism from opposition parties the government changed course, confirming on 2 March 2022 that Spain would send offensive weapons.²⁶⁷

Military assistance has included Hawk air defence systems (and requisite training), Patriot air defence missiles (as opposed to a Patriot system), Mistral and Aspid surface to air missiles, armoured vehicles, artillery munitions and Leopard 2 tanks.²⁶⁸

The value of Spanish military assistance in 2024 was €1 billion. A further €1 billion has been committed for 2025.²⁶⁹

Spain [supports the EU Training Mission for Ukraine](#), and has joined seven of the capability coalitions established under the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (maritime security, artillery, ground-based air defence, IT, drones, demining and armour).²⁷⁰

Spain signed a [10-year bilateral security cooperation agreement](#) with Ukraine on 27 May 2024.

Sweden

Sweden has had a longstanding policy of military non-alignment. In February 2022, however, the Prime Minister announced that Sweden would provide direct support to Ukraine's armed forces.²⁷¹ Russia's invasion of Ukraine also prompted Sweden, in conjunction with Finland, to [apply for membership of NATO](#). Sweden became the 32nd member of NATO in March 2024.

Military assistance to Ukraine has included, among other things, anti-tank and anti-ship weapons, ammunition, parts for advanced air defence systems (Hawk and Iris-T), infantry fighting vehicles, the Archer artillery system, Leopard 2 tanks, air-to-air missiles that have been re-purposed for ground-based air defence and an airborne surveillance and control aircraft.²⁷²

Sweden has also been co-financing international initiatives aimed at rapidly procuring equipment, including the Czech ammunition project and the

²⁶⁷ Euractiv, "[Spanish coalition split over decision to deliver weapons to Ukraine](#)", 3 March 2022

²⁶⁸ NATO, [Press conference by the NATO Secretary General](#), 13 October 2022; [Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union: 2023](#) (accessed 23 January 2024); Government of Spain, [Press release](#) (in Spanish), 15 June 2023; [Press release](#), 14 February 2024; [Press release](#) (in Spanish), 26 April 2024 and [Press release](#), 6 September 2024

²⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Press release](#), 28 March 2025

²⁷⁰ US Department of State, [Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine](#), 12 July 2023 and Government of Spain, [Press release](#), 23 January 2024 and [Press release](#), 13 June 2024

²⁷¹ Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde, @AnnLinde, [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), 27 February 2022 (accessed 25 January 2024)

²⁷² Government of Sweden, [Press release](#), 1 July 2022; [Press release](#), 30 August 2022; [Press release](#), 16 November 2022; [Press release](#), 24 February 2023; [Press release](#), 20 February 2024 and Swedish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 29 May 2024

International Fund for Ukraine.²⁷³ In August 2025, Sweden was one of the first countries to commit funding to the PURL initiative.²⁷⁴

In September 2024, the government confirmed that a new phase in military support would begin, with the focus of assistance on production and procurement, instead of donation.²⁷⁵

Sweden also participates in Operation Interflex, the EU training mission for Ukraine, and supports demining training in Lithuania.²⁷⁶ It has also joined eight of the capability coalitions, with the exception of ground-based air defence.²⁷⁷

Swedish military assistance, to date, totals SEK90 billion (approximately €8.2 billion).²⁷⁸ In May 2024, the Swedish Government announced a three-year framework for military support to Ukraine totalling SEK75 billion for 2024-2026 (€6.6 billion), or SEK 25 billion (€2.2 billion) per year.²⁷⁹

Sweden and Ukraine signed [a ten-year bilateral security cooperation agreement](#) on 31 May 2024.²⁸⁰

Further reading

- Government Office of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#)
- Government Office of Sweden, [Sweden's support to Ukraine](#)

Turkey

Until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Turkey was the only country other than the US to provide Ukraine with lethal arms in the form of armed Bayraktar drones.²⁸¹

Turkey has continued with the provision of Bayraktar drones, although the government has referred to the drone shipments as “private sales” rather than military aid as it seeks to maintain a balancing act between Russia and the West.²⁸²

²⁷³ Government of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 26 March 2024)

²⁷⁴ NATO, [Press release](#), 5 August 2025

²⁷⁵ Swedish Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 9 September 2024

²⁷⁶ Government Office of Sweden, [Press release](#), 16 November 2022 and Government Office of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 23 January 2024)

²⁷⁷ Government Offices of Sweden, [Military support to Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

²⁷⁸ As above

²⁷⁹ Government Offices of Sweden, [Press release](#), 24 May 2024

²⁸⁰ Government Offices of Sweden, [Press release](#), 31 May 2024

²⁸¹ Alarabiya News, [“Putin criticises Ukraine’s use of Turkish drones in Erdogan call”](#), 3 December 2021

²⁸² Reuters, [“Turkey, balancing Russia ties, says drones to Ukraine are sales not aid”](#), 3 March 2022

In June 2023 the Turkish Government was reported to have approved the necessary licensing permits for the Turkish company Baykar, which produces Bayraktar drones, to build a drone production plant in Ukraine. The plant is predicted to be operational in 2025.²⁸³

Turkey is also reported to have provided 50 mine-resistant armoured vehicles, with further deliveries expected.²⁸⁴

Other allies and partners

The remaining EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta), many of which are neutral countries, do not send lethal military equipment to Ukraine. They are, however, providing non-lethal assistance through the European Peace Facility. [Cyprus](#), [Ireland](#) and [Malta](#) also participate in the EU training mission for Ukraine.

Australia

Australia has provided over AUD \$1.3 billion (approximately US\$838 million) in military assistance to Ukraine since February 2022.²⁸⁵

That assistance includes armoured vehicles, M1A1 Abrams tanks, de-mining equipment, rigid hull boats and coastal defence, unmanned aerial systems, air defence capabilities, drones, precision munitions, artillery and ammunition.²⁸⁶

Since October 2023, an Australian E7-A Wedgetail early warning aircraft has also been deployed to Germany, along with up to 100 crew and support personnel, to help secure the route for humanitarian and military assistance into Ukraine.²⁸⁷

Australia has also made financial contributions to the International Fund for Ukraine and NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package Trust Fund.²⁸⁸

Australian Defence Force personnel participate in the UK training programme (Operation Interflex) and personnel are embedded with NATO's Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine command.²⁸⁹

²⁸³ AL-Monitor, "[Turkey's manufacturer of Bayraktar drones is building plant in Ukraine](#)", 7 February 2024

²⁸⁴ Defense News, "[Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine](#)", 22 August 2022

²⁸⁵ Australian Government, [Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 28 October 2025)

²⁸⁶ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 26 June 2023, [Press release](#), 27 April 2024 and Ministry of Defence, [Press release](#), 11 July 2024, [Press release](#), 17 October and [Press release](#), 5 November 2024

²⁸⁷ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 10 July 2023

²⁸⁸ Australian Government, [Press release](#), 4 July 2022 and Australian Government, [Press release](#), 15 February 2024

²⁸⁹ Australian Government, [Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#) (accessed 9 July 2025)

Australia is also a member of the drone capability coalition that is being led by the UK and Latvia.²⁹⁰

Further reading

- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, [Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#)

New Zealand

New Zealand has both donated, and provided financing for the purchase of, non-lethal military equipment for Ukraine. It also provides financing to the International Fund for Ukraine.²⁹¹ As of April 2025, the value of military assistance to Ukraine is \$152 million.²⁹²

Intelligence, logistics and liaison personnel have also deployed to the UK, Germany and Belgium to assist in the coordination of support and 100 military personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force are deployed as part of Operation Interflex. Those deployments have been extended to December 2026.²⁹³

Further reading

- New Zealand Defence Force, [Support to Ukraine](#)

Japan

Japan has been providing Ukraine with non-lethal military aid since March 2022.²⁹⁴

It does not provide lethal aid, but in December 2023 did amend its export control rules to allow the export of military equipment produced under foreign licence, to the countries of origin.²⁹⁵ That decision enabled Japan to provide Patriot air defence missiles to the United States to replenish its own stocks. While those missiles cannot be transferred to a third country without Japan's permission, the decision was regarded as inadvertent support for Ukraine as it allowed the US more freedom to send US-manufactured air defence systems to the country.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁰ ["Australia joins drone coalition agreement to aid in Ukraine war effort"](#), The Guardian, 21 March 2024

²⁹¹ New Zealand Government, [Press release](#), 13 July 2023

²⁹² New Zealand Defence Force, [Press release](#), 22 April 2025

²⁹³ As above

²⁹⁴ Reuters, ["US begins flying Japanese non-lethal military aid to Ukraine"](#), 16 March 2022

²⁹⁵ Nikkei Asia, ["Japan to allow arms exports to patent holder nations"](#), 14 December 2023

²⁹⁶ Nikkei Asia, ["Japan's Patriot missile transfer to US stuns Indo-Pacific watchers"](#), 23 December 2023

Japan has extended its support to the demining and IT capability coalitions and has provided financing to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package Trust Fund.²⁹⁷

As a member of the G7, Japan has committed to provide Ukraine with [long term security guarantees \(PDF\)](#) and in line with its pacifist constitution, Japan concluded an [Accord on Support for Ukraine](#) (PDF) in June 2024. It is the first security agreement concluded with a non-NATO member state and a country in the Asia-Pacific.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, [Press release](#), 30 March 2023 and Ministry of Defense, [Press release](#), 1 December 2023

²⁹⁸ President of Ukraine, [Press release](#), 13 June 2024 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, [Press release](#), 13 June 2024

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